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ABSTRACT 
Since Beijing organized the six-party talks in 2003 and persuaded North Korea to 
participate, much of the international community has applauded China’s leadership in 
attempting to stabilize the region.  However, some U.S. policymakers and regional 
experts have mistaken China’s preference for a non-nuclear Korea as indication that 
Beijing’s policy goals are more similar to U.S. policy goals than is accurate.  Some 
mistake China’s policy priorities in the region and, therefore, do not understand why 
Beijing does not take a more hard-line stance against North Korea.  Others overestimate 
China’s ability to influence North Korea.  The purpose of this thesis is to provide a 
clearer understanding of Beijing’s short-term and long-term policies toward North Korea 
and the limits of Beijing’s ability to influence Pyongyang’s behavior, in order to assist 
U.S. policymakers in formulating realistic strategies toward interaction with China on 
Korean peninsula issues. 
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A. THE CHEONAN  
On 20 May 2010, an international “Joint Civil Military Investigation Group” 
(JIG) composed of technical experts from the United States, Australia, Britain and 
Sweden concluded that a Republic of Korea (ROK) naval vessel, the Cheonan, which 
sank off the coast of South Korea two months earlier, had been destroyed by a torpedo 
and that, “the evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was 
fired by a North Korean submarine.”1 Washington characterized the attack as an “act of 
aggression” and South Korea promised “stern action.”2  The People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), in much softer language, “has called for restraint on all sides.”3  This tolerant tone 
is in character with China’s historic support for North Korea.  While in recent times, 
China may have joined the United Nations in condemning North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions, there is a distinct difference in Beijing’s attitude and level of concern for 
North Korea’s “rogue” behavior compared to that of the United States and its regional 
partners. 
Beijing’s policy goals toward the Korean peninsula do not correlate with stated 
U.S. goals of “peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market 
economy.”4  But then, what exactly are China’s goals for the Korean peninsula?  What 
does China desire in the short term and the long term?  How strongly is China able to 
influence North Korea in pursuit of its objectives?  In order to understand China’s 
behavior in Korean peninsula affairs, it is necessary to define China’s policy goals toward 
North Korea and assess its ability to achieve them.  Only by understanding China’s 
                                                 
1 “‘North Korean torpedo’ sank South’s navy ship–report,” BBC News, May 20, 2010, accessed May 
20, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia_pacific/10129703.stm. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” The 




intentions and limitations, can Beijing’s interaction with regional and international 
powers in negotiations with North Korea be appreciated.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
China’s policy objectives toward North Korea affect U.S. foreign policy in three 
areas:  nuclear proliferation; stability within the region; and growing Chinese economic 
and political power.  In each of these areas, U.S. policymakers must understand China’s 
point of view in order to determine whether and how China’s objectives can coincide 
with U.S. policy.  Sino-U.S. cooperation over Peninsula affairs is a litmus test of whether 
Washington will be able to respond to China’s rise in a competitive or in a cooperative 
manner, and determine if China will become a rival or a regional partner in ensuring 
global peace and stability.   
Since Beijing organized the six-party talks in 2003, and persuaded North Korea to 
participate, much of the international community has applauded China’s leadership in 
attempting to stabilize the region.  However, some U.S. policymakers and regional 
experts have mistaken China’s preference for a non-nuclear Korea as an indication that 
Beijing’s policy goals are more similar to U.S. policy goals than is accurate.  Some 
mistake China’s policy priorities in the region and, therefore, do not understand why 
Beijing does not take a more hard-line stance against North Korea.  Others overestimate 
China’s ability to influence North Korea.  New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman 
once indicated that China could resolve the North Korean nuclear issue by saying to 
Pyongyang, “You will shut down your nuclear weapons program and put all your reactors 
under international inspection, or we will turn off your lights, cut off your heat and put 
your whole country on a diet. Have we made ourselves clear?”5  Friedman fails to 
recognize all of the dynamics involved in China and North Korea’s relationship, which 
prevent China from taking such drastic measures, and Friedman is not alone in his 
misperception.    
                                                 
5 Thomas Friedman, “Brussels Sprouts,” New York Times, May 11, 2005, accessed May 28, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/11/opinion/11friedman.html. 
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According to a 2010 report for Congress, “the exact nature of China’s security 
concerns, its political objectives, and the extent of its influence on North Korean actions 
has remained elusive to many observers of PRC-North Korean relations.”6   That lack of 
knowledge has made deciphering Beijing’s reactions toward North Korean crises difficult 
to comprehend or predict.  The purpose of this thesis is to provide a clearer understanding 
of Beijing’s short-term and long-term policies toward North Korea and the limits of 
Beijing’s ability to influence Pyongyang’s behavior in order to assist U.S. policymakers 
in formulating realistic U.S. strategies toward interaction with China on North Korean 
issues.      
C.   HYPOTHESES 
This thesis posits three hypotheses.  China’s short-term objective for the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is to maintain the status quo.  China’s 
long-term objective is to encourage an evolution of the DPRK into a stable and 
economically prosperous, nonnuclear regime that remains aligned toward Beijing.  
Lastly, China’s relationship with North Korea is less coercive in nature than many 
believe, and instead is one of peculiar interdependence.     
Beijing does not advocate Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, nor does it 
desire the regional instability and threat of war resulting from North Korea’s 
unpredictable and provocative behavior, such as the recent sinking of the Cheonan.  
However, recognizing Pyongyang’s entrenched position and determination to maintain its 
current regime, Beijing prefers to maintain the status quo over any other options that 
might result in instability or war.  An often-heard quip regarding Beijing’s policy on 
North Korea is, “No war, no collapse, and no nukes.”  Therefore, in the short term, 
Beijing may cooperate with some international measures in an attempt to influence 
Pyongyang, but it will not advocate any attempts to effect regime change either by war or 
economic strangulation.  It will continue to advocate diplomatic measures and peaceful 
methods to convince North Korea to denuclearize and to behave. 
                                                 
6 Dick K. Nanto, Mark E. Manyin, and Kerry Dumbaugh, eds., “China–North Korea Relations,” 
Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2010, 3. 
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Despite Chinese rhetoric in support of peaceful unification of the Koreas, Beijing 
fears that a unified Korea would have strong ties with the United States, eliminating the 
buffer zone that North Korea provided.  A reunified Korea would also eliminate North 
Korea’s value as political and military leverage against the U.S. stance on Taiwan.  
Lastly, China has a population of nearly two million ethnic Korean-Chinese living just 
north of the Chinese-North Korean border.  A unified Korea might provide the impetus 
for a separatist movement.  Therefore, instead of a reunified Korea, China’s long-term 
objective is to encourage an evolution of the DPRK into a stable and economically 
prosperous, non-nuclear regime that remains aligned toward Beijing. 
While China’s position as Pyongyang’s largest trade partner and its primary 
external source of food and fuel would indicate a potential for a unilateral coercive 
relationship, in reality, North Korea seems to have surprisingly strong leverage against 
Beijing.  Pyongyang has proven masterful at manipulating China’s fears of collapse and 
regional instability to balance against Beijing’s economic influence.  Pyongyang is also 
aware of its significance to Beijing’s core interest in reunification of Taiwan and employs 
that knowledge to directly counter Beijing’s attempts to influence Pyongyang.  By 
manipulating these factors in its favor, North Korea has succeeded in avoiding a one-
sided dependence on China and instead has established a peculiar interdependency 
between the two nations.    
D.   TOPICS AND SCOPE BY CHAPTER 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of Beijing’s short-
term and long-term policies toward North Korea and the limits of Beijing’s ability to 
influence Pyongyang’s behavior.  This knowledge will hopefully assist U.S. 
policymakers in formulating constructive strategies toward interaction with China on 
North Korean issues.  This thesis focuses on specific factors that have impacted Beijing’s 
preferences toward the Korean peninsula and limit its coercive capabilities over 
Pyongyang.  These include: the current nature of China and North Korea’s historic 
alliance; China’s broader foreign policy priorities and specifically toward the Korean 
peninsula; Pyongyang’s significance to China’s policy objectives; China and North 
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Korea’s economic relationship; and Pyongyang’s understanding and ability to manipulate 
international dynamics in its favor.  Exploration of these factors facilitates the construct 
of a credible framework to test the three hypotheses of this thesis.  In order to logically 
present the research and summary findings, the remainder of this thesis has been 
organized in the following manner. 
Chapter II provides a framework necessary to understand Chinese-North Korean 
relations today.  It begins with a brief historical overview of China and North Korea’s 
relationship and explores the growth and eventual deterioration of Chinese and North 
Korean cultural bonds.  Today, common anti-Japanese and anti-U.S. sentiments are the 
most significant common views shared by China and North Korea.  Next this chapter 
provides a broad overview of China and North Korea’s national security concerns and 
policy priorities.  China’s strategic objectives are to maintain stability and peace in order 
to continue its economic rise.  North Korea’s primary objective is to achieve nuclear 
weapons state status and thereby render itself largely immune from external intervention 
into its domestic affairs.  Both nations perceive the United States simultaneously as the 
greatest potential facilitator, and the biggest obstacle, in achieving their respective 
political objectives.  
Chapter III gathers and evaluates evidence that provide indications of Beijing’s 
preferences for the Korean peninsula.  Beijing’s official policy toward Pyongyang has 
evolved from a well articulated security partnership into a more ambiguous relationship, 
except in the case of denuclearization.  In the face of this ambiguity, three approaches are 
taken to establish China’s actual preferences toward North Korea.  The first approach is a 
comparison of the most prevalent arguments regarding Pyongyang’s significance to 
Beijing.  The validity of these arguments is tested against key characteristics of China’s 
broader foreign policy.  The results indicate that North Korea’s primary significance to 
China is in its role as political and military leverage over the United States position on 
Taiwan, and in North Korea’s role as a buffer between U.S. and Chinese forces.  The 
second approach is a case by case study of China’s responses to North Korean 
provocations since the Korean War.  The evolution of China’s stance against nuclear 
proliferation and North Korea’s recent success in developing nuclear weapons has placed 
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Beijing and Pyongyang at odds.  As a result, China has recently adopted a more punitive 
approach toward constraining Pyongyang’s behavior, but has not changed its consistent 
preference for peaceful means to resolve the Korean peninsula dilemma.  The third 
approach is an in-depth exploration of China’s perspective of collapse or war on the 
Korean peninsula and how that perspective limits Beijing’s policy options.  China’s 
stance against collapse or war is not unique; arguably no nation desires either scenario, 
but the consequences for China would be unique in scope and nature.  Beyond the 
immediate consequences of a war or collapse on the Korean peninsula, Beijing also fears 
potential long-term repercussions to China’s national security. 
Chapter IV applies the evidence gathered in the previous chapters to prove the 
first two hypotheses of this thesis.  It begins by establishing why Beijing prefers a 
continued status quo on the Korean peninsula in the short term.  Based on a broad 
consensus that China’s primary objective is stability and that China fears war or collapse, 
there is little argument against this perception.  Some conjecture that changing 
international dynamics and increasing instability caused by North Korea’s provocations 
may be causing a shift in China’s stance.  As a variation, there is also the speculation that 
these changing dynamics may provide a window of opportunity to urge China to change 
its stance.  This thesis argues that while there are some elements of truth to these 
speculations, there is no conclusive evidence to support a belief that China would be 
willing to pursue regime change in North Korea.    
In contrast to the broad consensus on Beijing’s preferences for North Korea in the 
short term, there are various schools of thought on China’s preferences in the long term.  
These differences range from whether or not Beijing desires a reunified Korea or two 
separate Koreas; and Beijing’s preference on the political nature of a future separate 
North Korea, ranging from neutrality, socialism, or just political alignment with China 
versus the United States.  After addressing each of these arguments separately based on 
the framework and evidence established in the previous chapters, this section concludes 
that in the long term, Beijing desires Pyongyang’s gradual evolution into a stable and 
economically prosperous, non-nuclear regime, aligned with Beijing.   
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Having established Beijing’s preferences for the Korean peninsula, Chapter V 
explores Beijing’s ability to influence Pyongyang in pursuit of those preferences.  
Despite Beijing position as North Korea’s largest trade partner and its greatest source of 
foreign aid, Beijing’s coercive capabilities are limited by two factors that are often 
minimized.  Beijing is not North Korea’s only source of trade and foreign assistance.  
Pyongyang has demonstrated a remarkable ability to procure other sources of revenue 
and survive extreme economic hardship in the meanwhile.  Secondly, Pyongyang has 
demonstrated that it is keenly aware of its strategic importance to China and has utilized 
that knowledge to counter Beijing’s economic leverage.  Placing China’s economic 
leverage in perspective and demonstrating Pyongyang’s ability to counter Beijing’s 
economic leverage presents a clearer picture of China and North Korea’s relationship.  
Contrary to what some believe, it is not an asymmetrical coercive relationship slanted in 
Beijing’s favor.  Instead, as the third hypothesis of this thesis suggests, it is one of 
peculiar interdependence, based on each country’s reliance on the other to achieve its 
respective strategic goals. 
The concluding Chapter VI summarizes the findings of this thesis and identifies 
areas for additional research.  This thesis focuses on the key players in Korean peninsula 
dynamics, but in doing so, marginalizes the impact of broader international dynamics 
such as the rise of India or the growing role of international institutions. Written from a 
realist viewpoint, this thesis largely focuses on broader security concerns of state actors 
and does not take into account the value of alternative theoretical viewpoints such as 
competing elite perspectives that would be covered from a constructivist viewpoint.  
With flaws and limitations considered this thesis then offers some recommendations for 
policy makers.   
Washington and Beijing do not share the same priorities when dealing with North 
Korea.  Considering the primacy of Taiwan reunification as one of China’s core strategic 
concerns and North Korea’s manipulation of that factor, U.S. policy makers might want 
to consider a comprehensive approach to resolving the North Korean and Taiwan 
dilemmas.  Outside of that, if Washington is not willing to risk war against North Korea 
to effect regime change, policy makers may want to come to grips with the fact that 
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China is not likely to change its preferences on the Korean peninsula to suit the United 
States.  The United States can pursue its current course, follow China’s lead on 
engagement with Pyongyang, or pursue bilateral engagement with Pyongyang. 
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II. BIG BROTHER–LITTLE BROTHER 
A. EVOLUTION OF SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS  
1. New Bonds Formed in the Fire of Revolution and War 
Chinese and North Koreans share an ancient history dating back thousands of 
years.  In this age-old relationship, China enjoyed the role of “big brother” to Korea’s 
“little brother,” as Koreans perpetually looked toward China as the epicenter of culture 
and civilization.  In more recent times, China and North Korea have forged new bonds in 
the fires of communist revolution, the horrors of Japanese occupation, and the fierce 
battles and tribulations shared in the brutal Korean War.  These bonds were based on 
common ideology, anti-Japanese sentiment, and anti-U.S. sentiment.  Communism, 
exported from the Soviet Union, shaped the birth of China’s and North Korea’s modern 
incarnations as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK).  The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that defeated the 
Chinese Nationalists and took power in 1949 was created with financial support and 
ideological guidance from Moscow.  The Soviets occupied the northern half of the 
Korean peninsula upon agreement with the United States to accept the surrender of 
Japanese forces on the peninsula the end of World War II and orchestrated the Korean 
Workers Party’s (KWP) eventual ascendance to power in 1948.  Many of the senior 
leaders in both the CCP and the KWP received their political educations in the Soviet 
Union and throughout the reign of Joseph Stalin, China and North Korea maintained very 
close relations with their ideological progenitor.  As a result of the Sino-Soviet split in the 
1960s, the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and China’s and North Korea’s 
divergence from Marxist-Leninist communist principles, ideological bonds between 
China and North Korea have diminished.     
In contrast, the brutal Japanese occupation of Korea since 1910 and parts of China 
during World War Two (WWII) continue to bind Chinese and Koreans in a common 
hatred for the Japanese.  During their occupation of Korea, the Japanese attempted to 
wipe out the Korean culture, forcing the Koreans to speak and write only in Japanese.  
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Many Korean women were forced to serve as prostitutes known as “comfort women” to 
satiate Japanese soldiers.  Things were no better in Japanese-occupied China.  In a 
particular brutal event, known as “the Rape of Nanking,” Japanese soldiers butchered 
hundreds of thousands of unarmed Chinese men, women, and children.  Often the 
ingrained hatred and distrust for the Japanese are reignited by perceptions of resurgent 
Japanese nationalism.  When Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visited a Japanese war 
shrine in 2002 that housed the remains of known Japanese WWII war criminals, both 
China and North Korea responded with outrage and protest.7   
Chinese and North Korean cultural bonds and a common anti-U.S. sentiment 
played an important factor in Beijing’s decision to enter the Korean War in 1950.  The 
“Big Brother–Little Brother” relationship facilitated Mao Zedong’s efforts to raise strong 
public support for the war effort despite the reticence of many other Chinese leaders.8  
Because of the strength of ideological rifts during the Cold War era, the United States 
was perceived as the greatest external threat to both the PRC and the DPRK in the 1950s.  
This perception heavily influenced China’s decision to assist North Korea as Beijing 
feared an American military presence on the Korean Peninsula so close to China.  
According to some estimates, China suffered over 900,000 casualties and North Korea 
over 600,000, during the three-year conflict.9  Although China and the United States 
would grow increasingly close over the next six decades, China and North Korea have 
never stopped perceiving the United States as a significant external threat. 
B. A DIVERGENCE IN PATHS  
1. North Korea 
North Korea’s isolationist tendencies are rooted in Kim Il-Sung’s political 
philosophy of self-reliance known as “Juche.”  Kim Il-Sung perpetuated “Juche” as a 
means of consolidating his personal power.  By isolating North Korea from the outside 
                                                 
7 John Cherian, “A Visit and Its Aftermath,” Frontline 18 (2001):15–28. 
8 Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: From Comrades-In-Arms to Allies at Arm’s Length 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 1.  
9 Michael Hickey, “The Korean War–an Overview,” BBC, last updated March 10, 2011, accessed 
March 10, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_hickey_01.shtml#four. 
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world, Kim began incrementally recreating North Korean reality.  Kim Il-Sung perverted 
the communist principle on which the DPRK had been founded into a cult of personality 
based on totalitarian dictatorship.  Over the 40 years he reigned, Kim instituted ritual 
adulation for his person, rewrote history books, and built great monuments to portray 
himself as the savior of the Korean people from the Japanese and American devils. 
During this period, Kim Il-Sung marginalized the part Chinese played in the Korean War.    
The sum total of Kim’s efforts had the effect of raising him to a level of near-divinity in 
the eyes of common North Koreans. 10    
Kim Il-Sung designed and implemented an incredibly rigid hierarchical and 
hereditary governing structure built specifically to ensure the survival of his regime.  His 
son, Kim Jong-Il adopted his father’s leadership style and has perpetuated the totalitarian 
nature of the regime.  All media is under state control, freedom of speech is nonexistent, 
travel out of the country, except for government elites, is strictly prohibited.  All visitors 
into the country are closely monitored and allowed limited freedom of movement.  Over 
the last two decades, there has been a slight increase in information flow into North 
Korea, primarily from China.  Growing illicit activities in the porous border regions has 
facilitated transference of information into North Korea.  Yet by all indications, the 
increased flow of information has had little impact on the regime’s control over the 
population.  Today many consider North Korea as the most closed off society in the 
modern world.  The average North Korean is lucky to have a television or radio regulated 
to allow only government controlled broadcasts and only the most trusted elites are 
allowed to have cell phones, access to the Internet, or travel outside the country.11  
Since before the Korean War, North Korea’s primary goal has been to effect a 
reunification of the Koreas under Pyongyang’s rule.  That goal seemed plausible for the 
first two decades, based on comparable economic performance in the North and the South 
and North Korea’s superior military forces.  South Korea’s economic boom in the 1970s, 
                                                 
10 Andrei Lankov, North of the DMZ (Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland and Company, Inc., 
2007), 7–30. 
11 Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, “The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit 
Kingdom (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), 158–164. 
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North Korea’s failing economy, the loss of Soviet support, and the questionable military 
support of China has since made reunification under Pyongyang unlikely.   
North Korea’s economy managed to rebound from the devastation of U.S. air 
strikes during the Korean War and prospered at least until the late 1960s.  North Korea 
was rich in ores and hydroelectric sources of power.  A heavy industrial infrastructure set 
up by the Japanese and rebuilt and expanded upon by the Soviets allowed a motivated 
North Korean workforce to produce goods in sufficient amounts to offset the inherent 
fallacies of a command economy, at least for a while.12 
By the early 1960s, Kim Il-Sung’s decision to focus North Korea’s production 
capabilities on its military industrial complex and the inherent failure of command 
economies to respond to demand signals resulted in progressive stagnation of the 
DPRK’s economy.  From the 1970s to 1990, North Korea continued surviving just above 
starvation levels through foreign aid provided primarily by the Soviet Union.13  When the 
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, North Korea was devastated by the massive loss of 
revenue and entered into its bleakest economic years.14  The death of Kim Il-Sung in 
1994 was followed by the worst flooding and famine to have ever occurred in North 
Korea.  From 1995–1997, as many as two million North Koreans starved to death.15   
After consolidating his power base under a “military first” philosophy that further 
drained the resources of a struggling economy, in 2001, Kim Jong-Il began a series of 
experimental economic ventures with varying levels of success but no true economic 
                                                 
12 Hassig and Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, 69. 
13 Ibid. 
1414 The Soviet Union’s drawdown of foreign aid and cooperation with North Korea had  already 
begun in the late 1980’s as Mikhail Gorbachev pursued greater engagement with the West and was 
distancing the USSR from the DPRK.  In response to Moscow’s announcement that it was going to 
normalize relations with South Korea in September 1990, Pyongyang notified Moscow that such a move 
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to replace the loss of the Soviet umbrella.  With the end of treaty, the Soviets largely ended much of its 
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Korea’s largest trade partner, but this too came to an end in 1991, when the Soviet economic system 
collapsed.  See James Moltz, “U.S.-Russian Relations and the North Korean Crisis—A Role for the 
Russian Far East?” Asian Survey 45 (2005): 722–735, and Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations 
in the Post-Cold War World (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 21. 
15 Michael J. Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea—From the Late Nineteenth Century to the 
Present (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2010), 222. 
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revitalization.  These economic ventures ranged from:  manipulation of currency value; 
allowing limited free enterprise at local levels; pursuing joint ventures with foreign 
investors (primarily from China and South Korea) in designated free trade zones; and 
increased arms sales to foreign militaries.  All of these ventures have failed to revitalize 
the economy and according to 2009 estimates, North Korea ranks 196th out of 230 
countries with a GDP per capita of only $1,800.16 
North Korea’s foremost foreign policy objective today is simply regime survival.  
Pyongyang is attempting to force the international order to accept it as a nuclear weapons 
state and thereby render itself largely immune from external intervention and regime 
change.  Pyongyang views the United States simultaneously as its greatest adversary and 
the key to achieving security in the future.  North Korea also engages in nuclear 
brinkmanship in an effort to pressure the United States into conceding guarantees for its 
security.  Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and its constant provocations against 
South Korea and the United States threatens regional stability.  It is primarily because of 
North Korea’s threat to stability in the region that China has increasingly involved itself 
in peninsula affairs over the last decade. 
2. China 
In the last 60 years, China has experienced a major cultural, political and 
economic evolution.  From 1950 to the late 1970s, China was one of the world’s poorest 
countries based on per capita GDP.17  While having some limited success initially, Mao 
Zedong’s highly experimental economic project, “The Great Leap Forward,” failed to 
propel China into industrial viability with the West as hoped, and instead plunged China 
into one of the worst famines in history, killing as many as 30 million Chinese.18  China’s 
economic fortune took a turn for the better in the late 1970s when Deng Xiaoping steered 
China from a socialist command economy to a “market” economy, combined with a 
                                                 




17 Susan L. Shirk, China, Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18. 
18 Ibid. 
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strategy of opening China to the world economy.  Deng’s progressive economic 
programs and pursuit of normalized relations with the United States and Japan in the 
1970s launched a massive economic boom with often double-digit growth rates.  As a 
result, China has developed into the world’s second largest economy, behind only the 
United States in official GDP.19   
In contrast to North Korea’s isolated existence, China has embraced the 
information age and is heavily integrated into global society.  Over 800 million of 
China’s 1.3 billion people use cell phones and over 400 million use the Internet.20 
Chinese tourists are found travelling throughout the world and China itself has become a 
major destination for international travelers.  Over the last 60 years, China has emerged 
from forced isolation during the Mao era to an increasingly active role in world affairs.  
China has been a member of the United Nations Security Council since 1971 and belongs 
to many international organizations such as the G20, the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, and the Shanghai Security Cooperation Organisation (SCO).  It is 
involved in global environmental and humanitarian issues and in international discussions 
on security and freedom of navigation on the seas. 
China’s foreign policy today places primacy on stability and development but 
traditional concerns for issues of sovereignty, especially in regards to Taiwan, remain a 
core, if secondary, strategic interest.  On the domestic front, the CCP is facing increasing 
unrest ushered in by corruption, income disparity, and other negative aspects associated 
with liberalization of the market place, increasingly unfettered public access to 
information, and a rise of Chinese nationalism.  In 1993, there were 8,700 reported 
incidents of mass protest and in 2004, over 74,000, a tenfold increase in one decade.21  
The CCP must continue China’s economic rise or face even greater social unrest, which 
                                                 
19 GDP, CIA, The Word Fact Book, accessed on January 12, 2011. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2195.html?countryName=China&countryCode=ch&regionCode=eas&#ch. 
20 “China mobile subscriber total rises to 853 million in January,” Reuters, February 21, 2011, 
accessed March 1, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/21/us-china-mobile-
idUSTRE71K1VM20110221, and Rocky Fu, “China Internet Users by Numbers Feb 2011,” China Internet 
Watch, February 9, 2011, accessed March 1, 2011, http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/926/china-internet-
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21 Shirk, China, Fragile Superpower, 57.  
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is why peace and stability hold primacy in its foreign policy.  While economic growth has 
been the impetus for much social unrest, a halt in economic prosperity would cause far 
more social unrest than continued growth.     
The CCP must also control the rise of nationalism as it may prove a unifying 
factor for otherwise disconnected motivations for public protests.  Chinese nationalism, 
often spurred by anti-Japanese and anti-U.S. sentiment, can constrain Beijing’s choices in 
its interactions with Tokyo and Washington.  Susan Shirk believes that the CCP is 
attempting to harness Chinese nationalism as a legitimizing factor in the face of the 
diminished role of communism. 22  In order to maintain its position as the vanguard of 
nationalism, the CCP is forced to take a strong stance on international disputes of 
sovereignty, such as in the case of Taiwan or the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over 
the Senkaku Islands.  Despite its desires for stability and peace, this may be why Beijing 
often reacts with extreme vehemence in response to threats to its sovereignty as in the 
case of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, when China engaged in large scale military 
exercises and missile tests to intimidate Taiwanese from pursuing independence. 
The United States has become the largest external influence on China’s 
international relations.  As the world’s most dominant economic and military power, the 
United States will greatly impact whether China is able to continue its peaceful rise to 
international prominence.  Although the United States and China have grown 
economically interdependent, Beijing does not trust the United States for several reasons.  
Some Chinese leaders believe that there are forces in the United States that are pursuing a 
policy of “peaceful evolution” toward China, a Cold War tactic to subvert communist 
nations on behalf of capitalism and democracy.  Beijing resents U.S. intrusive attempts to 
control its behavior in internal matters such as when the CIA covertly provided financial 
support for Tibetan forces fighting against Chinese occupation in the 1950s and 1960s.23  
More recently, the United States imposed sanctions on China because of Beijing’s use of 
force during the 1989 Tiananmen crisis.  Lastly, Beijing perceives U.S. military presence 
                                                 
22 Shirk, Fragile Superpower, 64. 
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in the region, U.S. security cooperation with other Asian nations, and continuing U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan as indications that the United States is attempting to attempting to 
contain China.       
Continuing distrust of U.S. intentions and the rise of Chinese nationalism has 
influenced Beijing’s perceptions and responses to Sino-U.S. crises over the past two 
decades.  In the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Beijing conducted large-scale military 
exercises to indicate its displeasure at Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui efforts to push 
Taiwan toward independence and Washington’s support for Lee.  In 1999, the United 
States mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia during the NATO air 
campaign in Kosovo.  Despite an immediate U.S. apology and efforts to recompense 
China for the unfortunate event, Beijing cut off diplomatic relations and organized 
massive protests.  In 2001, a U.S. EP-3 intelligence collection aircraft was forced to make 
an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island, after a mid-air collision with a Chinese 
fighter jet.  Beijing refused to release the aircraft and crew until Washington issued a 
formal apology for its invasion of China’s sovereign territory and paid compensation.   
These incidents aside, Sino-U.S. relations have steadily improved over the past 
two decades, fueled by growing economic interdependence and broad efforts on the part 
of both nations to pursue a cooperative strategy in international affairs.  Yet Chinese 
distrust of U.S. intentions continues to play a role in Sino-U.S. relations and also affects 
China’s preferences toward the Korean peninsula.  Until 2002, China had remained 
largely on the sideline in peninsula affairs.  President George W. Bush’s inclusion of 
North Korea as one of the “Axis of Evil” states and the discovery of a North Korean 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in 2002 caused Beijing to fear that the United 
States was contemplating military action to remove the Kim regime.  Since then, 
Pyongyang has participated in six-party talks with the United States, North Korea, South 




China and North Korea share ancient cultural ties spanning centuries and 
sometimes converging strategic interests in the Cold War.  Due to divergent paths taken 
by their respective leaders under the PRC and DPRK, those ties have greatly diminished.  
Many Chinese have become global citizens, well educated and informed on domestic and 
international issues.  North Koreans, in contrast, live in the most isolated nation in the 
world under possibly the most totalitarian regime in recent history.  They are exposed 
only to highly censored and propagandized information, and have almost no personal 
freedoms, let alone any ability to shape the political realities of the state.  While the 
Chinese and North Koreans no longer share a “big brother–little brother” relationship, 
they do share some common interests and perceptions.   Foremost is their continued 
hatred for the Japanese, stemming from the legacy of Japan’s colonial occupation of both 
nations.  Distrust of the United States is also shared by both capitals, although to a much 
greater level in Pyongyang than in Beijing.  
China and North Korea have vastly different security and economic priorities.  
China’s broader strategic objectives are to maintain stability and peace in order to 
continue its economic rise.  While issues of sovereignty, especially over Taiwan, are still 
a core security concern, they take a back seat to Beijing’s focus on economic prosperity.  
North Korea has devolved into an economically failed state, heavily dependent on 
international support to continue limping forward.  Its primary internal security concerns 
revolve around a need to perpetuate its totalitarian control over the population.  
Externally, Pyongyang’s primary objective is to achieve status as a nuclear weapons state 
and thereby render itself largely immune from external intervention and potential regime 
change. 
The single greatest commonality between Beijing and Pyongyang in terms of 
strategic security perceptions is a shared view of the United States as the most critical 
external factor affecting their ability to achieve their respective political objectives.  In 
China’s case, the United States holds the key to China’s continued peaceful rise and is 
perceived as the greatest obstacle in Beijing’s desires for reunification of Taiwan.  North 
Korea perceives the United States as a much more immediate threat and fears that the 
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United States may pursue military options to overthrow the regime or lead a regional 
effort to isolate and economically starve the regime into submission. 
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III. CHINA’S POLICY ON NORTH KOREA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter traces the evolution of Beijing’s policy preferences toward North 
Korea and establishes that Beijing’s official policy toward Pyongyang has evolved from a 
well articulated security partnership into a more ambiguous relationship, except in the 
case of denuclearization.  In light of Beijing’s ambiguity, it evaluates China’s actual 
preferences toward North Korea through three approaches.  First, it evaluates the most 
prevalent arguments regarding Pyongyang’s significance to Beijing.  Next, it examines 
China’s behavior in reaction to North Korean provoked crises for further indications of 
Beijing’s preferences.  Lastly, it explores Beijing’s unique perception of collapse and war 
on the Korean peninsula and how that perception limits Beijing’s policy options.  
B. THE OFFICIAL POLICY 
China’s current official policy toward North Korea is ambiguous, but this was not 
always the case.  Eight years after the Korean War, the PRC indicated its official stance 
on the DPRK in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between 
the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1961.   
Article II reads, “The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to 
prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of 
one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several 
states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall 
immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.”24  Article 
VI, identifies Beijing’s preference for Korean reunification, “The Contracting Parties 
hold that the unification of Korea must be realized along peaceful and democratic lines 
and that such a solution accords exactly with the national interests of the Korean people 
                                                 
24 “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China 
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 20
and the aim of preserving peace in the Far East.”25  At least until the 1980s, this treaty 
represented Beijing’s preferences for the Korean peninsula.  
The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s caused some tension in Sino-North Korean 
relations but, in general, Kim il-Sung maintained close ties with both the PRC and USSR 
and often played on their adversity to extract greater military and economic aid.26  During 
the early years of Sino-U.S. rapprochement, Beijing still seemed intent on maintaining 
close security ties with the DPRK.  In the 1972 “Shanghai Communiqué” signed by 
Nixon and Zhou Enlai, Beijing insisted on the inclusion of its stance on North Korea, 
stating that China, “firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification 
of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the “U.N. Commission for the 
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.”27  After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping also 
supported North Korea despite Sino-U.S. rapprochement.  In 1983, during a conversation 
with U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, Deng emphasized that Beijing and 
the Washington should work together toward peaceful reunification of the Korean 
peninsula.28  Deng also warned that, “North Korea had ‘neither the intention nor the 
capability’ to attack the South but that if the South attacked the North, ‘China will not be 
able to stay out.’”29   
Although there is no way of pinpointing exactly when Beijing’s perspective on 
the future of the Korean peninsula began to change, it likely began to shift in the late 
1970s, following Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and engagement strategy with the 
international economy, specifically the United States.  It was during this period that 
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China and North Korea’s political and economic paths diverged in starkly different 
directions.  Beijing’s evolving economic priorities likely provided the impetus for 
Beijing’s eventual shift in stance on the Korean peninsula. 
In the 1990s, Beijing began to indicate that it would not automatically support 
Pyongyang in another Korean War.  In an official state visit to South Korea in 1995, a 
Chinese Foreign Ministry official announced to the media that, “the alliance did not 
commit Chinese troops to defending North Korea.”30  Beijing’s increasingly ambiguous 
stance has led Robert Scalapino to believe that the 1961 treaty, “no longer guarantees 
PRC military support in the event of a conflict,” implying that China might not support 
North Korea, no matter who attacked first, especially if Pyongyang provoked the 
conflict.31  This line of thought is substantiated by China’s support of UN sanctions after 
Pyongyang’s nuclear test in 2006.  UN Security Council Resolution 1718 banned the 
sales of any arms or nuclear technology to North Korea.  Beijing’s support for this 
measure stands in direct contravention to Article III of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 
which explicitly states, “Neither Contracting Party shall conclude any alliance directed 
against the other Contracting Party or take part in any bloc or in any action or measure 
directed against the other Contracting Party.”32  Although Beijing still affirms the treaty, 
its behavior and the treaty’s lack of any “operational components, such as a joint 
headquarters, joint planning, or even joint military exercises,” suggest it is no longer an 
accurate indicator of Beijing’s policy preferences toward North Korea.33  
The absence of any defined stance on the Korean peninsula dilemma in any of 
China’s recent official documents or statements also reflects Beijing’s shift to ambiguity.   
Since it started issuing official White Papers on national defense in 1998, Beijing has 
been making its strategic priorities and preferences transparent in nearly all areas where 
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there is a possibility of PRC involvement in a conflict, except on the Korean peninsula.  
References to North Korea have been conspicuously absent from China’s White Papers 
except in relation to Beijing’s stance on nonproliferation.   In a 2011 joint statement, 
Obama and Hu addressed common Chinese and American goals on the Korean peninsula, 
emphasizing “the crucial importance of denuclearization of the peninsula in order to 
preserve peace and stability in Northeast Asia.”34  In contrast to the 1972 Shanghai 
Communiqué, there are no clear indications of Beijing’s broader preferences for the 
Korean peninsula.   
In summary, the 1961 Treaty no longer reflects Beijing’s policy preferences for 
the Korean peninsula.  Beijing seems to be avoiding any official stance on North Korea, 
either because it is unsure of its preferences or because ambiguity better serves its goal of 
regional stability by restraining both U.S. and North Korean aggression.  The absence of 
an official policy on North Korea increases the importance of defining North Korea’s 
strategic value to Beijing, in order to draw an accurate picture of China’s preferences for 
the Korean peninsula. 
C. NORTH KOREA’S SIGNIFICANCE 
Beijing’s continuing support for North Korea has prompted many attempts to 
define how and why North Korea is significant to Beijing.  The following section 
identifies the most prevalent arguments and assesses their validity within the framework 
of China’s broader strategic priorities and against key characteristics of China’s foreign 
policy.  In the absence of a clearly defined stance by Beijing, this comparative assessment 
should provide some indications of China’s actual preferences toward the Korean 
peninsula. 
1. Communist Ideology 
A common explanation for Beijing’s continued support for North Korea is that 
Pyongyang is one of Beijing’s sole remaining communist allies.  Russell Ong posits that 
Beijing holds a comprehensive perspective of security that includes military, political, 
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economic, scientific, and technological security.35  Turning to a focus on Beijing’s 
political security, Ong posits that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political 
legitimacy of communism has been threatened and that North Korea as a “communist” 
state bolsters China’s political security.36 Ong believes that common ideology, anti-
American sentiment, and similar security concerns are what constitute a strong bond 
between China and North Korea.37 
Ong is not alone in his belief that ideology remains a strong bond between Beijing 
and Pyongyang.  Andrew Scobell suggests that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
China values North Korea as one of the few remaining “Leninist” nations that provide 
Beijing domestic political legitimacy.  Scobell states that, “Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
Zedong Thought are crucial to the formal justification of the Chinese Communist Party’s 
continued right to rule, and Party leaders cannot renounce this mantle.”38  Scobell 
believes that in order for the CCP to maintain its legitimacy as a communist-based 
authority, it needs to maintain strong relations with North Korea as one of the few 
remaining socialist nations.39  While others share Ong and Scobell’s belief that 
communist ideology remains a strong bond between China and North Korea, there is 
significant evidence to counter this argument. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist bloc nations in the 1990s 
did leave China isolated as one of the few other remaining communist nations in the 
world, but the CCP’s legitimacy crisis had begun in the 1980s with economic 
liberalization and global integration.  The CCP’s legitimacy crisis began as a result of its 
divergence from traditional communist economic principles in favor of market economic 
reforms.  If anything, the CCP’s economic prosperity, in contrast to the economic failure 
of the Soviet Bloc, would suggest the CCP would not want to be associated with those 
failed governments.  North Korea’s failed economic status hardly supports any better 
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arguments for the legitimacy of communist rule.   Fortunately for the CCP, it is unlikely 
that many Chinese even view North Korea as a communist state.  The Chinese have more 
citizens connected to the Internet than any other nation.  They are well aware of just how 
far the DPRK has devolved into a totalitarian system and consider North Koreans as 
“backward and strange.”40  Claiming ideological kinship with the DPRK might be 
necessary for diplomatic expediency, but far from validating Beijing’s communist 
pedigree, an ideological relationship with Pyongyang detracts rather than supports the 
legitimacy of Beijing’s communist rule.   
Ong, Scobell, and others who emphasize the strength of ideological ties between 
Beijing and Pyongyang overlook Beijing’s pragmatism in security and economic matters, 
even during the height of communist ideology in China during the 1960s and 1970s.  In 
response to a growing Soviet threat in the 1960s, Beijing pursued rapprochement with the 
United States, its ideological nemesis.  Similarly, despite the fact that Vietnam was also 
communist, it did not deter China from attacking it in the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979.  
In more recent times, the primacy of economic considerations over ideology is evident in 
China’s pursuit of close economic relationships with South Korea, Japan, and even with 
Taiwan.   
Perhaps common ideology played some role in China and North Korea’s political 
alliance based on the relationship between senior leaders of both nations forged during 
the Korea War era, but if so, that bond is fast dying out.  As David Lampton explains, 
“Maintaining good relations with North Korea, for example, is more important to China’s 
Korean War veterans than it is to younger Chinese, who often view Pyongyang as a 
retrograde, ungrateful drag on China’s quest for modernity, respect, and security.”41  
There are very few Korean War veterans left in China and, considering the CCP’s 
mandatory retirement age of 68, none in positions of political power.   
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2. Buffer State 
The conventional wisdom that Beijing values North Korea as a buffer against U.S. 
forces stationed in South Korea is perhaps the most prevalent explanation of Beijing’s 
continued support for Pyongyang.  One of the reasons China entered the Korean War was 
to prevent the presence of U.S. forces on China’s doorstep.  Considering the growing 
tension between the United States and China in the economic and security sectors over 
the last year, the need to keep a buffer between U.S. and Chinese forces on the ground, 
continues to be vital.  While unfortunate accidents such as the EP3 incident in 2001 are 
infrequent, a heavily militarized border between China and the United State that might 
manifest if not for the existence of North Korea, could become a formula for trouble 
during times of heightened tension between the Beijing and Washington.  While violence 
between the ROK and DPRK is undesirable, a conflict between China and the United 
States would have much greater economic and security consequences.  At least until 
Sino-U.S. relations has progressed beyond a point where conflict is likely, maintaining a 
buffer between U.S. and Chinese armed forces remains extremely pragmatic.  Escalation 
in peninsula tensions, however, detracts from North Korea’s value as a buffer state. 
Pyongyang’s utility as a buffer state between Chinese and U.S. forces is 
increasingly invalidated as Pyongyang’s provocations invite greater U.S. military 
presence in the region.  The Clinton administration considered military strikes on 
Yongbyon when Pyongyang first violated the NPT and expelled IAEA inspectors during 
the 1994 Korean Crisis.  In response to the recent Cheonan incident, the United States 
and the ROK agreed to delay the planned transfer of control over Korean forces from the 
Combined Forces Command to the ROK Army.  Additionally, ROK and U.S. forces held 
combined naval exercises in late 2010 in China’s Yellow Sea, a fact that greatly vexed 
Beijing.  While these reactions to North Korean provocations depreciate North Korea’s 
value as a buffer, it will not completely invalidate that role until such point as Beijing 
believes a war is imminent. 
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3. Leverage in Taiwan Issue 
The inclusion of Korean peninsula affairs in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué 
between Washington and Beijing generates another theory on North Korea’s significance 
to Beijing.  Beijing may perceive North Korea as a bargaining chip in the ongoing Sino-
U.S. conflict over Taiwan.  Although there are no Chinese policy statements indicating 
China is employing a tit-for-tat strategy with Taiwan and North Korea, the logic is hard 
to argue against as it serves Beijing’s desires to reunify Taiwan, while staying within the 
framework of Beijing’s greater focus on stability and economic development. 
In a 2006 publication, Shen Dingli, the executive director of the Institute of 
International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, structured a comprehensive 
argument to support his belief that Beijing utilizes North Korea as leverage against the 
United States over Taiwan issues.  To begin, Shen puts a “Taiwan” twist on the 
conventional buffer argument.  As a buffer, North Korea allows China to focus military 
presence along the Taiwan Straits instead of on the border with Korea.  Additionally, 
U.S. forces in Japan and the ROK are forced to divide their attention between the Korean 
peninsula and Taiwan, instead of focusing purely on Taiwan.42 
Shen also views the peninsula nuclear dilemma within the framework of Beijing’s 
focus on Taiwan.  A nuclear North Korea does not immediately represent a threat to 
Beijing but again, it distracts U.S. attention from the Taiwan Strait.  Washington is 
primarily concerned that Pyongyang might use nuclear weapons against South Korea or 
Japan and/or sell nuclear weapons and technology to others.  Beijing’s concern is that 
North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship is causing Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul to form 
stronger security bonds; and might cause Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to pursue 
nuclear weapons.  Beijing also fears that Pyongyang might pursue a “Libyan Model” and 
attempt to trade off its nuclear capabilities to establish a treaty of friendship with 
Washington.  A security alignment between Washington and Pyongyang would 
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undermine China’s regional security, specifically in the loss of Pyongyang as potential 
leverage against the United State over Taiwan.43 
In November 2010, just after North Korea’s artillery attack of Yeonpyeong 
Island, Christina Y. Lin, published a paper building on Shen’s premise to explain China’s 
continuing support for Pyongyang despite its aggressive behavior.  Lin suggests that as 
long as Washington continues to support Taiwan, such as with the $6 billion arms 
package sold to Taipei in 2010, Beijing will not take a hard-line stance against 
Pyongyang.  Yin illustrates that Chinese-North Korean relations seem to be growing 
stronger based on the level of high-level visits and official interaction between Beijing 
and Pyongyang in October and November.  In fact, on the day the DPRK shelled 
Yeonpyeong, China and North Korea signed a cooperative agreement on economy, trade, 
science and technology.44 
While there is no way to prove that Beijing is pursuing a tit-for-tat strategy, 
Shen’s and Lin’s arguments seem plausible.  There is also a separate theory that supports 
Shen and Lin’s views.  Timothy Crawford’s theory of pivotal deterrence explains U.S. 
strategy regarding Taiwan since the 1979 TRA.  According to Crawford, the United 
States plays the pivotal deterrence role by preventing China and Taiwan from going to 
war.  According to Crawford, the United States prevents China from taking military 
action against Taiwan via an ambiguous threat that the United States might support 
Taiwan in a military conflict.  Conversely, the United States restrains provocative 
Taiwanese behavior, such as a declaration of independence, with an ambiguous threat of 
staying neutral if China attacks.  This is why Washington avoids defining any official 
tripwires that would prompt U.S. actions in a China-Taiwan conflict.45 
China may be pursuing a similar role in preventing conflict between the United 
States and North Korea, and thereby increasing its value to both nations.  In order for 
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China to maintain that pivotal position it must remain ambiguous about any tripwires that 
would cause it to either support North Korea or stay neutral in a conflict between the 
United States and North Korea.  This would explain why Beijing maintains its ambiguous 
stance on North Korea, confounding Washington in much the same way as the United 
State’s ambiguous stance on Taiwan confounds Beijing.  While Beijing has never offered 
to revise its approach to North Korea in exchange for a revision of U.S support for 
Taiwan, the implications are clear.  Although Crawford’s theory may not fit perfectly, it 
does support Shen’s and Lin’s arguments for North Korea’s significance as it relates to 
Beijing’s core interest in Taiwan. 
4. Summary   
While there are other explanations for North Korea’s significance to Beijing, the 
three covered here are the most prevalent in literature on Sino-North Korean relations.  
North Korea provides Beijing military and potential political leverage against the United 
States’ position on Taiwan.  Pyongyang’s role as a buffer between Chinese and U.S. 
forces still applies today but loses value in the face of increased U.S. military focus and 
presence in the region in response to Pyongyang’s provocations.  China and North Korea 
do maintain strong political relations, as evidenced by recent increases in high level 
diplomatic visits between the two nations, and still share some common cultural 
perceptions such as anti-Japanese and anti-U.S. sentiment.  There are strong arguments, 
however, that indicate that China and North Korea no longer share strong political bonds 
based on common ideology. 
D. CHINA’S BEHAVIOR DURING NORTH KOREAN CRISES 
China’s behavior in response to North Korean nuclear provocations provides 
valuable clues to Beijing’s actual preference for the Korean peninsula.  Similarly, 
observations of Beijing’s responses to North Korean conventional provocations over the 
years also assist in constructing a valid framework for Beijing’s preferences toward 
Pyongyang.  This thesis approaches China’s responses to North Korean nuclear and 
conventional provocations as separate issues since Beijing does not perceive them in the 
same framework. 
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1. North Korea Nuclear Brinkmanship 
North Korea’s ventures into the nuclear arms arena began with a pursuit of 
nuclear energy for commercial use in the late 1950s.  With the support of the Soviet 
Union, Pyongyang successfully brought on-line a nuclear research reactor in 1965 at the 
Yongbyon Scientific Research Center.  Pyongyang joined the NPT in 1985 and signed 
the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Peninsula with South Korea in 1991, 
which banned possession of nuclear weapons, plutonium reprocessing, and uranium 
enrichment.  Soviet support for North Korea’s nuclear program continued until 1992, 
when the DPRK began to default on payments to the Soviet successor state, Russia.46  By 
then, however, the CIA assessed that the DPRK had accumulated enough plutonium and 
the technology to produce up to two nuclear weapons.47  Since then, Pyongyang has 
engaged in nuclear brinkmanship as a tactic to pursue security and international aid with 
surprising success.  Beijing was largely neutral or possibly even supported Pyongyang’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons until Beijing solidified its own stance on nuclear proliferation 
in the 1990s and began to take an opposing stance on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons 
aspirations. 
The first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 began 2 years earlier when IAEA 
inspectors reported that Pyongyang was providing false reports of plutonium production.  
When IAEA’s Hans Blix demanded North Korea allow special inspections to determine 
actual reprocessed plutonium levels, Pyongyang refused and threatened to leave the NPT 
in 1993.  In 1994, Pyongyang had its technicians remove 8,000 spent fuel rods from the 
reactors at Yongbyon, thereby making it impossible for IAEA inspectors to accurately 
determine the amount of plutonium that had been reprocessed for use in nuclear weapons.   
On May 11, 1994, the UN adopted Resolution 825, calling on the DPRK to return 
to the NPT but did not threaten any sanctions.  Pyongyang refused to comply and instead, 
launched a Rodong-1 missile into the Sea of Japan on May 29.  As tensions escalated, 
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Washington began contemplating a unilateral military strike on Yongbyon until former 
President Jimmy Carter intervened.  Acting as a private citizen, with Washington’s 
blessings, Carter travelled to Pyongyang and negotiated the foundations for an “Agreed 
Framework” to provide North Korea fuel, food, and two light-water reactors in exchange 
for Pyongyang’s agreement to cease its pursuit of nuclear weapons.48 
Part of the reason why the UN did not take a much harder stance on Resolution 
825 was due to Beijing’s opposition against the use of sanctions and threat to veto any 
resolution including sanctions against the DPRK.  Chinese Premier Li Peng explained 
Beijing’s belief that, “if pressure is applied on this issue, that can only complicate the 
situation on the Korean peninsula, and it will add to the tension there.”49  Yet, Beijing did 
make an incremental move to a harder approach toward Pyongyang by abstaining on 
Resolution 825, instead of vetoing it.  According to one source, “This shift is widely 
believed to have been instrumental in convincing North Korea to accept the 1994 U.S.-
DPRK Agreed Framework.”50  
China’s response to North Korea’s nuclear activities during this period reflected 
the transitional stage of Beijing’s stance on nuclear proliferation.  When first invited to 
join the NPT in 1968, China declined, accusing the United States and the Soviet Union of 
attempting to monopolize nuclear arms.  Beijing maintained that, “it stood for the 
complete abolition of nuclear weapons and did not advocate or encourage nuclear 
proliferation, but that the nuclear superpowers had no right to prevent non-nuclear 
weapons states from acquiring nuclear weapons until the nuclear superpowers committed 
themselves to complete disarmament.”51  As with China’s broader strategic priorities, 
China’s position on nuclear proliferation began to change with Beijing’s emphasis on 
stability and economic prosperity under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.  In 1984, China 
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joined the IAEA and that same year stated that, while Beijing was still not ready to join 
the NPT, “the treaty had had a positive impact and had contributed to the maintenance of 
world peace and stability.”52  Since joining the NPT in 1991, Beijing has become an 
increasingly strong advocate and supported the effort to extend the treaty indefinitely in 
1995.  Yet China’s growing support for the NPT did not indicate a wholesale 
abandonment of China’s value for sovereignty in international affairs. 
In a 1995 document on China’s stance on proliferation, Beijing implied a 
tolerance for nuclear arms for states like North Korea. 
All nations have the right to maintaining an appropriate national defence 
capability and to legitimate self-defence. It is necessary at all stages of the 
arms control and disarmament process to ensure all nations from 
sustaining damage to their security. All nations, big or small, have the 
right to join in discussions and decisions on arms control and disarmament 
on an equal basis. The implementation of international arms control and 
disarmament must not impair the independence and sovereignty of any 
nation, entail the use of force or the threat of force, or interfere with the 
internal affairs of any nation. 53  
What Washington viewed as a soft stance against North Korean nuclear brinkmanship 
was Beijing’s continued commitment to its historic stance of nonintervention into 
sovereign affairs of other nations. 
Beijing maintained a moderate stance on Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons 
over the next decade.  In 1998, when Pyongyang failed to put a satellite in orbit but 
demonstrated the advance in North Korean missile technology, the United States and 
Japan responded with great concern.  President Clinton overrode congressional resistance 
to continuation of the 1994 Agreed Framework and promised heavy fuel aid to North 
Korea that had been obstructed by congressional opposition.54  Japan, even more 
concerned than the United States, as the missile flight path took it over Japan, responded 
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in a punitive manner by cutting off all assistance to North Korea until 2001.55  Both 
nations began to more aggressively pursue cooperation to develop antiballistic missile 
technology.56  China merely stated that, “it had no prior knowledge of the launch” and 
promised the United States that it will help keep “nuclear missiles out of North Korea.”57   
While tensions between Pyongyang and Washington seemed to be diminishing 
during the latter half of Clinton’s administration, the Bush administration’s much more 
hawkish stance toward Korea caused a downward spiral in U.S.-North Korean 
relations.58  On June 6, 2001, after a complete review and revision of the Clinton policy 
on North Korea, Bush offered to reduce sanctions against North Korea but only if North 
Korea agreed to:  “start to take serious, verifiable steps to reduce the conventional 
weapons threat to the South; undertake ‘improved implementation’ of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework; and allow verifiable ‘constraints’ on North Korea’s missile exports.”59  
Pyongyang, which has historically demanded the United States must first ease economic 
pressure and provide security guarantees before North Korea would give up its nuclear 
arms program, was not impressed.  In 2002, George W. Bush included North Korea as 
one of the “axis of evil” in his State of the Union address and specifically pointed out that 
North Korea was “arming itself with missiles and weapons of mass destruction.”60  In 
2002, Washington’s announcement that Pyongyang was pursuing a highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) program prompted another Korean nuclear crisis.  Throughout that 
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period, Washington and Pyongyang engaged in what would be an almost comical battle 
of wills if not for the gravity of the situation.  The following media excerpts from 2001 
through 2003 highlight the primary impasse of that struggle as “you first.”      
 10/25/02 A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement says North Korea is 
willing to address U.S. concerns if Washington agrees to a nonaggression 
treaty, recognizes North Korea’s sovereignty, and does not hinder its 
economic development. 
 11/13/02 President Bush decides to cut off U.S. oil shipments to North 
Korea after the November delivery unless North Korea dismantles its 
nuclear weapons program. 
 1/10/03 North Korea announces it is withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty because it is “most seriously threatened” by the 
United States. 
 1/28/03 in State of the Union speech, President Bush says “the North 
Korean regime is using its nuclear program to incite fear and seek 
concessions; America and the world will not be blackmailed.” 
 2/5/03 North Korea announces the reactivation of its nuclear reactor at 
Yongbyon for “peaceful purposes.” 
 8/7/03 Speaking at Washington’s Foreign Press Center, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell reiterates that the U.S. government is prepared to provide a 
written security assurance, but it will not enter into a non-aggression pact. 
 8/13/03 KCNA quotes a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman as 
saying that a non-aggression pact is the only way to resolve the crisis and 
rejects an early inspection of North Korean facilities as “impossible and 
unthinkable” without changes in U.S. policy. 
 10/30/03 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher reiterates the U.S. 
position that North Korea needs to dismantle its nuclear weapons program 
before receiving proposed security assurances.61 
During this period, Beijing stayed largely on the sidelines, viewing the conflict as 
primarily a matter between the United States and North Korea.  Beijing played an 
interlocutor role via high-level visits, such as Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s 
visit to the DPRK Embassy in Beijing in December of 2002, to warn North Korea that its 
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provocative behavior was undermining regional stability.62  China also participated in a 
series of three-party talks but, again, its primary role was as an intermediary.         
In 2003, Beijing began to take a much more active role in the Korean peninsula 
nuclear dilemma for two primary reasons.  After the United States wiped out Iraqi forces 
in March 2003 on the preemptive justification that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, 
a U.S. military operation against North Korea, seemed like the next logical step in U.S. 
efforts against the “axis of evil.”63  Whether or not the United States would have actually 
taken military actions against North Korea is secondary to the fact that the increasingly 
aggressive U.S. stance was being met by an even more aggressive stance by Pyongyang.  
Beijing feared an overly provocative move by Pyongyang could launch a series of 
escalating responses leading to resumption of the Korean War.  This greatly concerned 
Beijing as even the threat of conflict disrupted stability in the region and acted as a 
barrier to economic development.  Also, North Korea’s apparent progress in its pursuit of 
nuclear arms conflicted with Beijing’s evolving stance on nonproliferation.  As tensions 
increased, Beijing was forced to take a more active stance to mitigate the risk of 
instability or even war in the region.   
But even as Beijing began to take incremental measures to restrain North Korea, it 
did not abandon Pyongyang.  In April 2003, Beijing indicated in a joint statement with 
Moscow, that, “the use of force to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis would be 
‘unacceptable’…North Korea’s security must be guaranteed and conditions created to 
facilitate its socio-economic development.”64 
On the other hand, Beijing had begun to take more stringent measures to pressure 
North Korea to abandon nuclear brinkmanship.  In one case, high-level DPRK officials 
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visiting Beijing were told “to stop provoking the Americans, hinting that if Pyongyang 
ignored the advice, China would not be able to maintain its long-standing opposition to 
sanctions.”65  In another instance China took a more active approach when it intercepted 
a railway shipment into North Korea of tributyl phosphate, a chemical used for 
processing plutonium.66  There are also reports that Beijing may have purposely cut off 
oil to North Korea in February 2003 to persuade Pyongyang to return to talks, Beijing 
however, claimed that the temporary shutdown was because of “technical issues.”67  
Beijing’s greatest contribution during this period was its engineering and hosting of the 
six-party talks.  While the six-party talks were welcomed by five of its participants, 
China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, Pyongyang held out, wishing 
instead to deal bilaterally with the United States, as it had during the Clinton 
Administration.  Beijing is credited for finally persuading Pyongyang to the table.  
While the six-party talks were originally hailed as a great success, the 
negotiations were never able to overcome the primary dilemma of the “you first” 
mentality held by both Washington and Pyongyang.  Eventually, North Korea boycotted 
the talks and renewed its nuclear arms program.  In 2006, Pyongyang again conducted 
missile tests including possibly a long-range Taepodong II missile.  Beijing, frustrated by 
Pyongyang’s obstinacy, joined the international world in condemning Pyongyang’s 
behavior.  The UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1695, which 
demanded North Korea end all related ballistic missile activity and immediately return to 
the six-party talks.  While China and Russia still held out against the inclusion of 
sanctions in the resolution, it still marked the first time China did not abstain in a UN  
resolution against Pyongyang.      
Beijing’s holding out against the use of sanctions ended three months later, when 
Pyongyang detonated a nuclear device on October 9, 2006.  UN Resolution 1718, passed 
unanimously five days later, included a range of economic and military sanctions against 
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Pyongyang.  Beijing also publicly and strongly condemned Pyongyang’s behavior in 
state-controlled media throughout China.68  Yet, Beijing still did not wholly abandon its 
commitment to North Korea’s sovereignty or its emphasis on peaceful methods to 
denuclearize the Korean peninsula.  During the formulation of 1718, Beijing objected to 
the boarding and searching of North Korean vessels, and in contrast to the U.S. hints of 
punitive measures in its statements, Beijing continued to push for peaceful measures to 
pursue denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.   
 United States:  “The goals were clear: a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, 
and to work with other countries to ensure that the DPRK faced serious 
consequences if it continued down its current path.” 
 China:  “Proceeding from the overall interests of bringing about 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and maintaining peace and 
stability there and in North-East Asia, China supported the Council in 
making a firm and appropriate response.  The action of the Security 
Council should both indicate the firm position of the international 
community and help create enabling conditions for the final peaceful 
solution to the DPRK nuclear issue through dialogue.”69 
China’s transition to a hard-line stance against Pyongyang’s nuclear arms 
pursuits, however, did little to deter North Korea’s determination to become a de facto 
nuclear weapons state.  In April 2009, Pyongyang again conducted another long-range 
missile test.  China again responded by endorsing even more stringent sanctions against 
specific North Korean commercial interests.  North Korea’s response—a second nuclear 
detonation on May 25, 2009—was loud and clear, “you first.”  The UN Security Council 
responded with another resolution, 1874, that expanded on the measures and mechanisms 
of 1718, but did not endorse any more punitive actions. 
Since Beijing joined the NPT in 1992, its stance on proliferation and preference 
for a denuclearized Korean peninsula has been at odds with Pyongyang’s desire to 
become a de facto nuclear weapons state.  The growing possibility of conflict between 
Pyongyang and Washington has increasingly threatened China’s related but broader 
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concern for regional stability and economic prosperity.  Beijing has responded by taking 
an increasingly hard-line stance against Pyongyang but despite its attempt to curb North 
Korea’s behavior, Beijing has not abandoned Pyongyang.  Beijing continues to provide 
Pyongyang the most international assistance and is still its largest trade partner.  
Although China endorses UN sanctions against North Korea, Beijing’s level of 
enforcement has been questionable.  According to a recent CRS report to Congress, 
“China’s enforcement of those U.N. sanctions, however, is still unclear. China has 
enforced some aspects of the sanctions that relate directly to North Korea’s ballistic 
missile and nuclear programs, but Beijing has been less strict on controlling exports of 
dual use products. Chinese shipments of banned luxury goods to the DPRK continue to 
increase.”70 
2. North Korean Conventional Provocations  
This section addresses China’s response to North Korean conventional 
provocations, such as the recent Cheonan incident.  The reason why this section is 
covered separately from North Korean nuclear brinkmanship is that China does not 
perceive Pyongyang’s non-nuclear provocations within the same framework.  
Pyongyang’s nuclear provocations contravene Beijing’s official stance on proliferation 
and its preference for a non-nuclear and stable Korean peninsula.  Pyongyang’s sporadic 
non-nuclear provocations are perceived by Beijing largely as bilateral matters with South 
Korea that do not directly affect Beijing.  And when North Korean conventional 
provocations did warrant a Chinese response, Beijing viewed them as individual events to 
be addressed on a case-by-case basis, rather than through a comprehensive view required 
of nuclear provocations.   
Before continuing, the terms “provocations” or “attacks,” used interchangeably 
within this section, need to be defined.  In its report on North Korean provocations, the 
U.S. Congressional Research Services (CRS) defines “provocation” as, “armed invasion; 
border violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; 
terrorism (including assassination and bombing); threat/intimidation against political 
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leaders, media personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South 
Korean government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and 
tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.”71  In this section, all of the same 
definitions apply except “test of missiles and nuclear weapons.”  The CRS has listed over 
one hundred sixty events since 1950 that meet its definition of “provocation.”  Yet there 
is very little reporting on Chinese responses to the vast majority of these provocations.   
China did not normalize relations with South Korea until 1992.  While Sino-U.S. 
relations were normalized in 1979, political and military tensions continued between the 
two nations under primarily due to Washington’s continued support for Taiwan and the 
belief by some Chinese that Washington desires to contain China.  As might be expected, 
Beijing either supported North Korean provocations during the Cold War or kept largely 
silent on events of which it disapproved.  This is especially true of North Korean 
conventional military provocations against South Korea and the United States.  Since the 
PRC’s media have always been state-controlled, Chinese reporting on Korean 
provocations was muted or noncommittal if there was reporting at all.  When reporting 
did occur, it was an indication that the event was of such magnitude that it somehow 
adversely impacted China’s strategic objectives. 
In 1968, North Korean agents attempted to infiltrate the South Korean Blue 
House, the home of South Korea’s President, in a foiled assassination attempt.  As this 
occurred during a period when China was attempting to improve relations with the 
United States, some speculate that China’s decision to withdraw its delegation from the 
Military Armistice Commission from 1968 to 1971 was prompted by increasing North 
Korean provocations.72  If true, the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo 
intelligence collection vessel just two days after the Blue House Raid probably also 
contributed to Beijing’s attempt to distance itself from Pyongyang.  This would not be the 
only time a North Korean assassination attempt would prompt a response from Beijing. 
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On October 9, 1983, a North Korean special forces unit attempted to assassinate 
South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan during a state visit to Rangoon, Burma.  While 
failing to kill Chun, the bomb killed 17 South Koreans and 4 Burmese nationals, eliciting 
a strong international response condemning the attack.  Although Chun promised 
retaliation and the U.S. military elevated its military readiness, the event did not result in 
a renewal of military conflict.73 
The attack came as a surprise to Beijing.  Just the day before, Chinese officials 
had passed information from Pyongyang to Washington, indicating that for the first time 
Pyongyang would allow South Korea full participation in three-way talks.74  Beijing had 
been acting as an interlocutor between Pyongyang and Washington since Sino-U.S. 
rapprochement had begun in the early 1970s.  As Sino-U.S. relations increased, Beijing 
began placing increasing importance on a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula.  
Upon hearing of the Rangoon bombing, Deng Xiaoping was livid and cut off 
communications with Pyongyang.  The Chinese media was given a green light to print 
factual accountings of the Rangoon bombing to include the views of Rangoon.75  There 
were no UN sanctions imposed on Pyongyang for this action.  Many years later, during 
the UN’s discussion of the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 
1996, the North Korean representative raised the issue of the Rangoon bombing and the 
lack of any UN action.  The Chinese representative ignored the South Korean 
representative’s statements and made no response to them during his comments.76   
On November 29, 1987, two North Korean agents successfully planted a bomb on 
Korean Air Flight 858, which exploded mid-flight from the United Arab Emirates to 
Seoul, Korea.  One of the DPRK agents successfully killed himself upon being detained 
by the authorities; however, the other DPRK agent was interrupted as she attempted to 
inhale a cyanide-laced cigarette.  Eventually, the female agent, Kim Hyon Hui, confessed 
                                                 
73 “Record of North Korea’s Major Provocations since 1960s,” Conventional Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, May 25, 2010, 1. 
74 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 145. 
75 Ibid. 
76 “Security Council meeting 3627,” undemocracy.com, accessed February 21, 2011, 
http://www.undemocracy.com/securitycouncil/meeting_3627#pg008-bk02.  
 40
and indicated that the order for the attack came directly from Kim Jong-Il.  As the attack 
occurred just before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Seoul chose not to pursue any military 
response and, instead, submitted the matter to the UN for resolution.   
Although the event was discussed over a lengthy period, both China and the 
Soviet Union blocked any UN resolutions against North Korea and, in their comments, 
refused to even acknowledge that North Korea was responsible for the tragic incident.77  
China refused to allow the discussion to move from the general assembly to the security 
council, stating that, “under the present circumstances, consideration of this question by 
the security council could only lead to intensifications of the tense atmosphere between 
the north and the south and would not be conducive to the relaxation of tension and 
stability on the Korean peninsula.”78  The United States, however, placed North Korea on 
its list of state sponsors of terrorism.79 
Chinese media responses to Pyongyang’s conventional military provocations 
against the United States have been even rarer.  While the U.S. presence in the region 
may be providing stability and Beijing and the United States are growing increasingly 
interdependent, Beijing still perceives U.S. military presence in Asia as the type of 
hegemony that Beijing vehemently opposes, as indicated in its white papers.  Distrust and 
apprehension of the U.S. military is perhaps the one area where China and North Korea 
still share common security perceptions.   
Consider the remarkably similar behavior of Pyongyang and Beijing in the cases 
of the Sino-U.S. EP-3 incident in 2001 and North Korea’s seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo in 
1968.  Beijing claimed the EP-3 violated its airspace and characterized its emergency 
landing on Hainan Island as an act of aggression despite the fact that the EP-3 was forced 
to land because of the mid-air collision caused by the aggressive flying of a Chinese 
fighter pilot.  Beijing forced the United States to issue an apology (of sorts) before 
releasing the crew.  When Pyongyang seized the U.S.S. Pueblo in 1968, it insisted the 
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vessel was invading its territorial waters, despite the fact that the Pueblo was in 
international waters.  Pyongyang also required the United States to make a formal 
apology before releasing the crew of the Pueblo.  The very next year, Pyongyang shot 
down a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft on the grounds that it was invading North 
Korean airspace.  Beijing and Pyongyang have a similar message for the United States in 
instances where they feel the U.S. military is being too intrusive, “back off.”  This does 
not mean that Beijing desires military conflicts between North Korea and the United 
States, it means that when they occur, Beijing is constrained to support Pyongyang based 
on their common perception of the U.S. military threat.     
Although there is little doubt that Pyongyang continues to view the South Korean 
military as a direct security threat, China has had no significant conflict with the South 
Korean military since the Korean War.  Beijing does not view the small nation as a 
security threat except in its role as a host nation for U.S. military forces.  Therefore, there 
must be a different reason for Beijing’s muted responses in instances of North Korean 
military attacks against South Korea.  One probability is that Beijing loses nothing in its 
relationship with South Korea by remaining neutral in instances of North Korean 
provocations.   
Throughout the 1990s, Seoul increasingly adopted a policy of engagement and 
peaceful development toward North Korea, especially under President Kim Dae-Jung’s 
Sunshine policy enunciated in March 1998.  Throughout the entire George W. Bush era, 
China and South Korea held very similar preferences for the carrot instead of the stick to 
entice Pyongyang to play nice.  In some years during the 2000s, South Korean economic 
assistance to North Korea surpassed that of China for short periods.  While the current 
Lee administration is more hawkish in its views of North Korea, a significant number of 
people in South Korea’s government and society still share Beijing’s dovish approach to 
resolving the Korean peninsula dilemma.  Therefore, China’s forgiving stance toward 
Pyongyang runs little risk of alienating Seoul or impacting their significant trade 
relationship.  Taking an official stance against Pyongyang, however, would greatly 
impact their relationship and possibly reduce Beijing’s ability to influence Pyongyang.  
Also by acknowledging Pyongyang as a culprit, Beijing would lose the ability to block 
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UN sanctions against Pyongyang.  In short, Beijing’s muted response to Pyongyang’s 
military provocations against South Korea stems from a desire to prevent or mitigate the 
isolation of North Korea.   
From Beijing’s perspective, isolating North Korea is the worst possible course of 
action for several reasons.  First, bilateral sanctions against Pyongyang by regional 
nations only mean that Beijing will have to carry a greater load on its own back to keep 
North Korea afloat.  Second, should China have to support a UN resolution against North 
Korea, like it already has on two occasions, Beijing itself, is restrained from its apparent 
goal of trying to keep the Kim regime afloat.  While Beijing has taken steps to curb 
Pyongyang’s behavior, including some support for sanctions, it is still resolved to keep 
the Kim regime in place.      
This exploration into Beijing’s behavior in response to North Korean nuclear 
brinkmanship and conventional provocations reveals some trends in China’s behavior.  In 
response to North Korea’s nuclear provocations since the 1990s, Beijing remained largely 
neutral and consistently advocated a peaceful process for denuclearization of the 
peninsula.  Two factors contributed to Beijing taking a more active role in Korean 
peninsula nuclear affairs in 2003.  First, Beijing’s own stance on nuclear proliferation 
evolved throughout the 1990s and eventually placed Beijing directly at odds with 
Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.  Second, as a result of the Bush 
administration’s aggressive stance toward North Korea in 2002 and Pyongyang’s equally 
aggressive defiance, Beijing feared that tensions might escalate to war.  Although Beijing 
began to take a more active part in the peninsula affairs by engineering the six-party 
talks, it continued to advocate peaceful means to resolving the peninsula crises and 
attempted to curb any international movements against North Korean sovereignty.  Even 
after adopting sanctions against North Korea in its response to the 2006 and 2009 nuclear 
tests, Beijing has remained the most forgiving of all the nations involved with the 
peninsula peace process and remains North Korea’s greatest trade partner and largest 
provider of aid. 
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China’s responses to North Korea’s conventional provocations have been even 
more muted than its response to nuclear brinkmanship.  Even in the few instances when 
Beijing did respond to North Korean conventional provocations against Seoul, China 
consistently stressed the need for peaceful resolution of the Korean peninsula issue and 
objection to the use of sanctions.  Beijing’s consistent emphasis on peaceful measures in 
response to Pyongyang’s nuclear and conventional provocations provides a strong 
indication of its preference to maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula. 
E. COLLAPSE AND MASS MIGRATION 
This last section explores Beijing’s perceptions of the potential implications of 
collapse of the DPRK and war on the Korean peninsula and how they limit Beijing’s 
policy options.  Beijing’s concerns about collapse or war are not unique.  Arguably no 
nation desires either scenario, but the consequences for the United States would be far 
different in scope and nature than for China.  In addition to the immediate consequences 
of a war or collapse scenario on the Korean peninsula, Beijing also harbors unique fears 
of long-term repercussions to China’s national security.     
In one of the famed Wikileak documents released to the press in 2010, 
Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, stated in correspondence in May, 
2009, “If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less 
bad for China than a North Korea that has collapsed.”80  Lee was the first prime minister 
of Singapore and ruled for over 30 years.  His extensive contacts with the CCP leadership 
lend great weight to his views.  Yet even without Lee’s input, Beijing has made no secret 
that its greatest fear on the Korean peninsula is of a North Korean collapse and the 
resulting mass migration of millions of North Koreans into northeast China.  Even more 
than collapse, Beijing fears that Pyongyang may instigate a war to prevent a collapse 
from occurring.  Maintaining the Kim regime appears to be the only way Beijing can 
avoid a collapse in North Korea and prevent North Korea from provoking a war.    
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Before continuing, let us clarify the term “collapse.”  As Samuel Kim states, “The 
collapse of an economy does not automatically lead to the collapse of the regime, which 
could in turn trigger the collapse of the system, and so on, leading to the collapse of the 
state.”81  Also, in some cases, a regime can collapse while the state continues to exist.  
The current changes in Tunisia and Egypt are both examples of how a regime, in this case 
the autocracies of Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, can collapse while the 
state continues its existence.  In North Korea’s case, however, the “system” and the 
“state” is the Kim regime.  The only way the Kim regime is likely to collapse is through 
external intervention, such as war. 
Unlike the pseudo-democracies in Egypt and Tunisia, there is no clear separation 
between state and society in North Korea.  The Kim regime has indoctrinated the entire 
North Korean population into a cult of personality system that is the foundation of not 
only the social structure but also the government system in much the same way as a 
theocracy would operate, if the deity were also the head of the nation.  The entire 
government and military structure is built upon a highly intertwined web of nepotism that 
functions based on the relationship between elites whose powers derive from their 
relationship to the Kim family.  That structure is permeated throughout North Korean 
society through a highly elaborate songbun ranking system down to family units.82  As 
Chinese leaders have a much closer relationship with North Korea, it is likely that they 
are far more familiar with this aspect of North Korean society than their counterparts in 
Washington.   
Unlike the explosion of unrest in Egypt and Tunisia, where the population desired 
political alternatives, the North Koreans have been beaten down and brainwashed their 
entire lives.  As Samuel Kim observes, “As things stand, the mood of the North Korean 
people is best described as characterized not by an increased sense of deprivation ready to 
explode but by quiet alienation and combat fatigue.”83  Based on Pyongyang’s brutal  
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intolerance for political opposition, if mass protests were to occur, the North Korean 
military and security forces would annihilate those uprisings long before they could build 
enough momentum to threaten the regime.    
In any case, a mass uprising in North Korea prompted by economic deterioration 
or even a complete collapse of the economy seems very unlikely.  By some standards, the 
North Korean economy already collapsed in the late 1990s and since then has relied on 
external sources of aid to continue limping forward.  As stated in one recent book on 
North Korea, based on a World Food Program (WFP) estimate, “one-third of the people 
never have enough to eat, half sometimes do not have enough, and only 10 to 20 percent 
always have enough to eat.”84  According to the same source, since 1990, the North 
Korean economy has only been operating at 25 percent capacity.85   
Arguably, the economy of North Korea could get worse, so bad that North 
Koreans simply start flooding across the border; or the Kim regime could simply allow a 
significant portion of its population to starve to death while maintaining control over the 
border.  This is essentially what occurred during the great famine in the 1990s, when, by 
some estimates, one out of every ten North Koreans (roughly 2 million of North Korea’s 
population of 20 million) simply starved to death and 63 percent of the children were 
malnourished.86  In short, it appears that Pyongyang is largely immune to any form of 
internal collapse even in the direst economic straits.   
Beijing’s greatest fear, however, is that before the situation deteriorates to a point 
where any type of collapse might occur, Pyongyang will instigate a war.  Pyongyang 
portrays its economic deterioration as the result of Western sanctions and attempts to 
isolate North Korea.  Much of Pyongyang’s provocative behavior since the 1980s, 
especially in regards to nuclear brinkmanship beginning in the 1990s, stems from 
Pyongyang’s insistence that its adversaries provide assistance to North Korea or suffer 
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the consequences.  While U.S. and South Korean leadership are heavily constrained by a 
low public threshold for war, Pyongyang is not.  The millions of lives that would be lost 
in a resumption of the Korean War are far more acceptable in Pyongyang than in 
Washington and Seoul.   
Should the United States and its allies somehow succeed in causing a collapse in 
North Korea without war, the consequences would still be horrific for Beijing.  
Hypothetically speaking, should China cut off aid to North Korea, as many in 
Washington desire, Pyongyang could open its borders to the North allowing its starving 
citizens to flee into China.  If China sealed off its borders, it would amount to a 
humanitarian disaster that would make Tiananmen pale in comparison and possibly even 
result in a Chinese—North Korean military conflict.  China’s other option is to allow 
millions of Koreans into its northeast region, an area already heavily populated by ethnic 
Koreans, fueling potential for a future separatist movement.  And China would still find 
itself facing the logistic challenge of feeding millions of refugees.  As one Chinese 
official puts it, “We can either send food to North Koreans or they will send refugees to 
us—either way, we feed them.  It is more convenient to feed them in North Korea than in 
China.”87 
If a North Korean collapse came about because of war, the end result would be 
the same, millions of refugees flooding China, but with the added dimension of large 
numbers of fleeing armed military personnel.  The border region between China and 
North Korea has already absorbed as many as 300,000 North Korean refugees and has a 
growing criminal presence.88  The influx of millions of armed soldiers would only add to 
instability in the region and pose a huge demilitarization and rehabilitation dilemma for 
Beijing.  Additionally, the likelihood of U.S. troops entering into North Korea in an 
attempt to secure all of Pyongyang’s known chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons 
sites, some near the border with China, could result in conflict between U.S. and Chinese 
forces.   
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The aftermath of a collapse also poses long-range security issues for Beijing.  
Whether U.S. and ROK forces, or Chinese forces, occupy the North, there is no longer 
any buffer between U.S. and Chinese forces.  Beijing would most assuredly prefer 
Chinese occupation of the North over the possibility of a unified Korean peninsula under 
Seoul’s leadership aligned with the United States.  This is all the more true because Seoul 
might gain possession of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons, at least for an undetermined 
period of time.  In short, no matter how it occurs, a North Korean collapse or 
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IV. CHINA’S SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter takes the evidence gathered in Chapter III and applies it within the 
framework of China’s and North Korea’s broader strategic priorities to define Beijing’s 
preferences for the Korean peninsula in the short term and long term.  Beijing’s 
perception on the significance of North Korea to its strategic priorities, observations of 
Beijing’s response to North Korean provocations, and Beijing’s unique perception of the 
consequences of war and collapse on the Korean peninsula all provide valuable evidence 
to support the hypotheses of this thesis.  Beijing prefers the status quo in the short term, 
and Pyongyang’s gradual evolution into a stable and economically prosperous non-
nuclear regime, aligned with Beijing in the long term.  Competing points of views are 
evaluated in this chapter as they pertain to the findings of this thesis.    
B. CHINA’S SHORT-TERM PREFERENCE FOR THE STATUS QUO     
The argument of this thesis is that, in the short term, Beijing desires to maintain 
the Kim regime in preference over all other viable options.  This is actually the easiest 
hypothesis to prove as there are no major arguments countering that Beijing desires to 
maintain the Kim regime in the short term.  Beijing prefers to keep the Kim regime in 
power because it is the only option that meets its strategic priority for stability and 
supports all of its lesser security objectives.   
Beijing’s behavior in response to North Korean provocations and Beijing’s 
perspective of the North Korean nuclear threat support this view.  While Beijing clearly 
desires a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, as the North Korean nuclear capability does not 
directly threaten China, that concerns appears secondary to Beijing’s desire for stability 
in the region.  Beijing’s refusal to pursue a policy of isolation and economic strangulation 
in response to North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship and Beijing’s continued emphasis on 
peaceful resolution to the Korean peninsula dilemma clearly indicate Beijing’s desire to 
maintain the status quo.   
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The collapse of the Kim regime through war is the greatest threat to stability in 
the region and unacceptable to Beijing as a massive influx of refugees into Northern 
China would destabilize the region.  While increasing economic sanctions and other 
measures to isolate the Kim regime could lead to eventual economic collapse (or rather 
greater economic collapse), it is doubtful that the Kim regime will ever lose control over 
the population.  In the unlikely event that internal dissension ever manifests at a level that 
threatens the control of the regime, Pyongyang will respond by engaging in genocide of 
its own people and/or provoking a renewed Korean War.  While the U.S.-ROK alliance 
would almost certainly triumph, the end result would garner the same consequences of 
collapse for Beijing, mass migration of North Koreans into North China.  In addition, a 
war scenario would present China with several other undesired consequences beyond 
collapse.  China would be faced with the potential problem of demobilizing and 
reintegrating massive numbers of North Korean military personnel that fled to northeast 
China.  A war scenario also presents the possibility that China might become entangled in 
direct military conflicts with either North Korean forces or U.S. and ROK forces. 
Lastly, the elimination of the Kim regime, either through collapse or war, would 
likely result in a unified Korean peninsula under Seoul with continued alignment with the 
United States.  This would eliminate the strategic value Pyongyang provided Beijing as 
leverage against the U.S. stance on Taiwan, and deprive Beijing of any buffer between 
Chinese and U.S. forces. All of these factors lead Beijing to prefer a status quo over any 
attempt to effect a regime change in Pyongyang.  However, there is increasing conjecture 
that China may be (or should be) considering regime change as a policy option, based on 
recent changes in regional dynamics.   
According to recent reporting of Wikileak documents, one high-ranking Chinese 
official stated his belief that Beijing, “lacks the will to push Pyongyang to change its 
behavior, but Beijing will not necessarily oppose the United States and South Korea in 
the case of a North Korean collapse.”89  Whether this reporting is accurate or not is 
irrelevant.  There are undoubtedly officials in China who not only contemplate regime 
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change in North Korea, but may even greatly desire it.  As one Chinese academic states, 
“There are signs that Chinese thinking toward North Korea is becoming increasingly 
pluralistic. But the North Korean question remains the single most divisive foreign policy 
issue in China.”90   
Chinese opinions, even amongst its highest leaders, are likely to differ, just as 
much as U.S. officials differ in their views of how to deal with North Korea.  The 
Wikileak documents do not come with the caveat that the opinions expressed in these 
diplomatic correspondences are the opinions of the individuals and in no way represent 
the official view of the Chinese government. Unlike official press statements by nations, 
diplomatic conversations are not constrained by public responses and allow a freedom of 
expression by their participants.  To some, that might suggest a level of sincerity or 
honesty, making the document an invaluable tool to gain insight into the views of senior 
decision makers, but that is only half true.  Private conversations allow diplomats to cater 
the conversation to a specific audience.  Consider what the language in that 
correspondence might have been if they were intended for Pyongyang instead of 
Washington.    
Even if the Wikileak documents offers some valid insight into the thoughts of 
some officials, the primary take away from those documents is that some Chinese 
officials are more frustrated than others with Pyongyang and wish to change its behavior, 
but realize they cannot.  China’s frustration with Pyongyang’s behavior is evident in 
many open documents and in Beijing’s response to Pyongyang’s provocative behavior in 
the past, most especially in its recent support for UN sanctions.  This thesis does not 
argue that China approves of Pyongyang’s behavior; it argues that China is forced to 
continue supporting Pyongyang because there are no other acceptable options that meet 
China’s strategic priorities.  As the Wikilleak official says, “China lacks the will to push 
Pyongyang to change its behavior.”  Basing a belief that Beijing is contemplating a 
change of its preference for the status quo in Pyongyang based on the Wikileak 
documents ignores the mountain of evidence that argues otherwise. 
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Much speculation on China’s preference for status quo or regime change, even 
before the Wikileak documents appeared, seems to be a product of wishful thinking or 
even policy suggestions for China rather than an assessment of China’s actual policy 
stance.  In May 2010, Scott Snyder suggested that China’s desire for regional stability 
could, (or rather should) prompt it to pursue a regime change in Pyongyang.  Snyder 
supports more punitive measures toward North Korea and argues that South Korea’s Lee 
Myung-bak is hoping the recent Cheonan incident will break the current deadlock 
between Pyongyang and the United States by prompting greater international cooperation 
against Pyongyang.  Snyder says that, “in addition to support from the United States, 
South Korea needs China to prioritize stability over the status quo if Lee’s strategy is to 
be successful.”91   
Snyder seems to imply that the current level of instability in the region is rising to 
a level that should be unacceptable to Beijing and that China should start considering a 
change of the status quo in light of recent alignment of views between the United States 
and South Korea.  National Asia Research Fellow Sung-Yoon Lee appears to take a 
similar view.  In a recent presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International Center of 
Scholars, Lee proposes that, “the collapse of the DPRK falls within the realm of 
possibility—within a reasonable degree of possibility.” According to Lee, the 
“mainstream academic discussion and military planning within South Korea assume such 
a contingency’s possibility,” and “it is both possible and desirable for the United States to 
begin indirectly engaging Chinese leaders to manage better the North Korean regime’s 
potential collapse.”92 
Whether an international coalition, even with China’s support, could successfully 
effect a regime change in Pyongyang without war is outside the scope of this thesis, but it 
is the author’s personal view that such a possibility is unlikely.  Despite its unifying 
                                                 
91 Scott A. Snyder, “China’s Litmus Test: Stability or Status Quo on the Korean Peninsula?” Council 
on Foreign Relations, May 28, 2010, accessed June 3, 2010, 
http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2010/05/28/china%E2%80%99s-litmus-test-stability-or-status-quo-on-the-korean-
peninsula/. 
92 Sung-Yoon Lee, “Is Status Quo Destiny? China’s Interests in Post-Kim Dynasty Korea,”a 
presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, January 24, 2011, accessed 
February 22, 2011, http://www.nbr.org/Research/activity.aspx?id=112. 
 53
effect on its adversaries, Pyongyang’s recent successes in developing nuclear capabilities 
increases rather than decreases its ability to continue blackmailing the international 
community.  Beijing’s recent behavior indicates it shares this view as evidenced by the 
December 2010 agreement with Pyongyang to invest $2 billion in a joint Chinese-North 
Korean special economic zone.93  China’s support for North Korea is reluctant but 
required by Beijing’s pragmatic realpolitik approach.  Despite the conjecture of these 
analysts otherwise, all the evidence gathered in this thesis indicates that Beijing will 
continue to prefer the status quo, despite some change in regional dynamics. 
C. CHINA’S LONG-TERM PREFERENCES 
While there are very few arguments that Beijing prefers anything but the status 
quo in the short term, there are several competing hypotheses on Beijing’s long-term 
preferences for the Korean peninsula, especially in regards to the type of government that 
would emerge.  Most authors posit their hypotheses in a comprehensive manner.  For 
instance, in a view very similar to the hypotheses of this thesis, Robert Scalapino 
suggests that China’s position on North Korea is quite clear:  “The PRC does not want a 
collapsed DPRK, a nuclear DPRK, or another conflict.  Hence it favors the status quo 
continuing, meanwhile encouraging the North to pursue an evolutionary process that 
would preserve ‘socialism’ while undertaking those major changes that would enable it to 
become a part of the modern world.”94  While Scalapino does not explicitly say so, his 
exclusion of the term “reunification” and his pointed use of “the North,” indicates his 
belief that Beijing prefers two separate Koreas in the future.  There are three broad 
categories that must be addressed in a comprehensive discussion of China’s preferences 
for the Korean peninsula:  Beijing’s short-term preference for the status quo versus 
regime change; a preference for reunification versus two Koreas; and, lastly, what type of 
government Beijing prefers in a reunified Korea or in a separate North Korea. 
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As China’s short-term preference for the status quo has already been established, 
this section will focus on the latter two categories.  The first discussion establishes 
Chinese preference for a separate North Korea over a reunified Korea.  A separate 
discussion will assess competing hypotheses on what type of government Beijing desires 
in the North.  While this artificial dissection and grouping of comprehensive arguments 
will result in some redundancy, it offers the clearest method of comparing and contrasting 
the relative value of competing hypotheses.   
In one final note on methodology, to avoid superfluous argument, it is important 
to clarify the precise nature of what is being discussed, as the future China prefers for 
North Korea and not the future that is most likely (although China’s preferences will 
heavily impact that outcome).  Tang Shiping, a Chinese academic, clearly distinguishes 
between the two, “While China clearly believes that reunification is inevitable…the truth 
is that China has no incentive to facilitate Korean reunification based on the current US-
ROK intention to maintain an alliance after the unification.”95  The following discussion 
focuses on China’s preferences for the Korean peninsula, not an assessment of the 
likeliest outcome.       
1. To Reunify or To Not Reunify 
In Article VI of the 1961 treaty between the PRC and the DPRK, China officially 
endorses reunification of the Korean peninsula, “The Contracting Parties hold that the 
unification of Korea must be realized along peaceful and democratic lines and that such a 
solution accords exactly with the national interests of the Korean people and the aim of 
preserving peace in the Far East.”  China continuously paid lip service to that stance in 
official statements up through the early 1990s.  As late as 1991, Jiang Zemin supported a 
plan to reunify North Korea similar to China’s system with Hong Kong, “one nation, one 
country, two systems and two governments.”96  In recognition of the growing disparity in 
economic realities between Seoul and Pyongyang, Beijing has since changed its stance on 
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reunification and the likelihood that any reunified Korea would fall under Seoul, Beijing 
has changed its preference from reunification to a desire for a continued separate North 
Korea.   
From a political perspective, if Beijing truly desired to see a reunification of the 
two Koreas, it is unlikely that it would have supported the entrance of both South Korea 
and North Korea into the United Nations in 1991 and then normalized relations with 
Seoul in 1992.  On the economic side of the house, China has supported South Korea’s 
economic rise since normalized relations, increasing trade from just over $6 billion in 
1992 to over $79 billion by 2004.97  Despite the media’s focus on China’s continued 
support for North Korea, according to reports in early 2011, Chinese trade with Seoul has 
reached over $207 billion compared to China’s $3.5 billion trade relationship with 
Pyongyang.98  China’s behavior seems to indicate a growing acceptance of a more 
permanent state of two Korean nations.  Accepting that Beijing is against reunification of 
the two Koreas, however, begs the question of why?   
Reunification of the Koreas can only occur in three ways:  after a war; after a 
collapse; or by absorption.  As already discussed, Beijing cannot accept war or collapse 
as viable options because of the instability caused by refugees, the loss of North Korea as 
leverage in the Taiwan straits issue, and the loss of a buffer between U.S. and Chinese 
forces.  Absorption offers the only possible way for the two Koreas to reunite peacefully.  
Absorption is based on the German model of reunification where a much more 
prosperous West Germany engulfed an economically failed East Germany.  In a Korean 
peninsula scenario, South Korea would absorb North Korea.        
While peaceful reunification by absorption would maintain stability and prevent a 
mass migration into China, it would not prevent Beijing’s loss of Pyongyang as leverage 
against Washington over Taiwan or its role as a buffer state.  Beijing opposes 
reunification because of the likelihood that in almost any reunification scenario, the 
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United States would have more influence over a reunified Korea than China.  A reunified 
Korea with close U.S. ties would effectively eliminate Pyongyang’s significance as 
leverage in China’s ongoing dispute with the United States over Taiwan.  At least for 
some length of time, if not indefinitely, a reunified Korea would host U.S. troops, 
effectively eliminating the buffer zone that Pyongyang provided.  Lastly, a reunified 
Korea could possibly remain a de facto nuclear weapons state, and the last thing China 
wants is another nuclear nation on its border, especially one that is aligned with the 
United States.  China’s fear of the negative impacts of absorption is present in arguments 
posited by several experts.   
As mentioned earlier, Tang Shiping does not believe Beijing views reunification 
of the Korean peninsula is in its best interest.  In a 2002 journal article, Tang posits that 
in a comparison of reunification scenarios, the most likely scenario to occur is a reunified 
Korea with a military alliance with the United States, an outcome that Tang describes as 
contrary to the interests of the countries in the region.99  Tang explains, “This is because 
the United States will do its best to maintain its military presence on the peninsula and 
thereby constitute a constraint on China and Russia (or even Japan).”100  Samuel Kim 
agrees with Tang, and explains, “What intensifies Beijing’s security concern and its 
opposition to the unification-by-absorption scenario is the perception of U.S. strategy on 
the Korean nuclear issue.”101  While his reasoning is slightly different from Tang’s, 
Kim’s bottom line is the same, China does not prefer reunification. 
In summary, Beijing prefers a separate North Korea over a reunified Korea.  
Reunification can only occur after a war, collapse, or by absorption.  War and collapse 
are completely unacceptable to Beijing and reunification by absorption would result 
nation that is aligned with Washington instead of Beijing.  This would eliminate North 
Korea’s value as leverage against the U.S. position on Taiwan or as a buffer between 
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U.S. and Chinese forces.  Until there is a significant change to in the dynamics of Sino-
U.S. relations, Beijing will continue to prefer the existence of a separate North Korean 
state over any reunification scenario. 
2. Socialism, Capitalism, or Neutrality? 
Accepting that China prefers a separate North Korea over a reunified Korean state 
in the long term, there is a divergence of opinion on what type of future regime China 
desires in Pyongyang.  The second hypothesis of this thesis is that Beijing prefers North 
Korea undergo a gradual evolution into a stable and economically prosperous, non-
nuclear regime, aligned with Beijing in the long term.  There are three schools of thought 
on what type of regime Beijing desires in a future North Korea.  One school of thought 
posits that Beijing desires that the DPRK develops into a genuine communist state.  
Another suggests that Beijing has outgrown the boundaries of Cold War ideology and in 
pursuit of realpolitik goals cares only that the new regime maintains its alignment toward 
Beijing over Washington.  The final option is that Beijing desires the emergence of a 
neutral North Korea.     
Russell Ong argues that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political 
legitimacy of communism has been threatened and that North Korea as a “communist” 
state bolsters China’s political security.102  Ong believes that ideology, a common “anti-
Americanism” sentiment, and similar security concerns are what constitute a strong bond 
between China and North Korea.  Based on this, Ong argues that China would want a 
future North Korean regime to be socialist.  Ong is not alone in his belief.  Robert 
Scalapino also supports this view, saying that Beijing desires Pyongyang to, “pursue an 
evolutionary process that would preserve ‘socialism’ while undertaking those major 
changes that would enable it to become a part of the modern world.”103   
Ong and Scalapino overestimate the importance of “socialist” ideology to 
Beijing’s policy decision making process.  There are several factors that argue against a 
view that China prefers North Korea remain a communist state.  Cultural ties between 
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Chinese and North Koreans have deteriorated to the point that Chinese no longer feel any 
strong affinity for North Koreans.  Chinese and North Koreans no longer share a “big 
brother—little brother relationship.”  Also, it is debatable whether Chinese even view 
themselves or North Korean as truly “socialist” any longer. 
The CCP’s ongoing crisis of legitimacy indicates that Chinese would not 
emphasize with North Koreans along ideological lines.  According to Susan Shirk, 
China’s evident abandonment of communism has left the CCP with a lack of legitimizing 
ideology.104  Logically, if the CCP no longer believes that Chinese perceive themselves 
as communists, it is not likely to make any political decision regarding the DPRK based 
on common ideology.  And the CCP is well aware that the DPRK is no longer a socialist 
state but a totalitarian dictatorship with only socialist trappings.   
China’s pragmatic behavior in the past also indicates the minimal impact of 
ideology in its policy preferences.  Consider China’s decision to ally itself with the 
United States during the latter period of the Sino-Soviet split.  During the 1960s, 
communist ideology was at the height of its power and influence in China.  Once the 
Soviet Union began manifesting itself as a security threat, Beijing chose to seek 
rapprochement with the United States.  Although the United States was China’s arch 
nemesis in the ideological spectrum, Beijing chose pragmatism over ideological 
considerations. 
While high-level officials from both China and North Korea may still make 
references to their close ideological bonds, it far more likely that these are no more than 
diplomatic niceties made in order to facilitate relations, rather than indications of any true 
ideological bonds.  While not enough evidence to suggest Beijing desires regime change, 
the comments revealed in recent Wikileak documents reveal that many Chinese officials 
are not very fond of the North Koreans, despite any lingering ideological similarities. 
In summary, evidence suggests that Beijing no longer has any strong ideological 
ties with North Korea and even if it did, ideological bonds would not be a primary 
consideration in Beijing’s policy formulation.  Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated 
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realpolitik pragmatism in its foreign policy preferences and, therefore, while Beijing 
would not object to a socialist government forming in a future Pyongyang, it would not 
block the formation of other regime types either.  Beyond stability and economic 
development, Beijing’s primary concern for a future Pyongyang regime is that it stays 
aligned with Beijing’s security interests.  As Tang explains, “China is not concerned with 
a unified Korea’s ideological orientation but with its security orientation.”105  Whether a 
future North Korea is socialist or democratic or autocratic is of less importance to Beijing 
than whether or not it supports China’s views on Taiwan or its claims in the Southeast 
China Sea.   
The third option most commonly brought up in discussion of North Korea’s future 
is the concept of neutrality. Tsuneo Akaha defines neutrality in the following manner:  
A neutralized state is conventionally defined as “a state whose political 
independence and territorial integrity are guaranteed permanently by a 
collective agreement of great powers, subject to the conditions that the 
neutralized state will not take up arms against another state, except to 
defend itself, and will not assume treaty obligations which may 
compromise its neutralized status” International recognition of a neutral 
(or neutralized) state normally requires both other states’ commitment not 
to attack militarily and not to interfere with the internal affairs of the 
neutral state. A set of obligations are also required on the part of the 
neutralized state, such as the obligation “not to use military force except in 
self-defense, not to permit other states to use its territory for military 
purposes or to interfere with its domestic affairs, not to enter alliances or 
other international agreements compromising its neutralized status, and 
not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states.”106  
The benefits of a neutral Korean peninsula have been discussed as far back as 
1885, as means to protect a tiny Korean nation from its much larger and dominant 
neighbors.107  Since the division of Korea after WWII, the concept of neutrality has been 
applied both as a means and an ends to resolving the current division on the Korean 
peninsula.  To clarify, there are some proponents that advocated neutrality as either a 
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means to accomplishing reunification of the Korean peninsula or an end result of 
reunification.  Still others have discussed the benefits of a neutral North Korea in a two-
Korea scenario.  While the dynamics differ somewhat, from China’s standpoint, the 
overall benefits versus the consequences of neutrality in both a reunification scenario and 
a separate North Korea scenario are the same.  In short, Beijing does not perceive a 
neutral North Korea in its best interests, at least not for the foreseeable future. 
Neutrality offers Beijing a seemingly excellent resolution to the Korean peninsula 
dilemma if properly implemented; a neutral North Korea could continue to act as a buffer 
against U.S. forces in South Korea or even result in the removal of U.S. forces from 
South Korea entirely.  Neutrality would also force Pyongyang to demilitarize and 
denuclearize, and in general offer a much more stable and secure regional environment 
for development.  However, a neutral North Korea would invalidate China’s current 
position as the greatest external influence in Pyongyang and neutralize Beijing’s ability to 
use North Korea as political and military leverage in any future Taiwan conflict.   
Another reason why China would not prefer a neutral North Korea is that 
neutrality might only be a transitional state.  After a period of neutrality, North Korea 
may slowly align itself with Washington.  Alexandre Mansourov provides a relevant 
historic view of the use of neutrality by rising powers attempting to secure a realignment 
of Korea in their favor.    
Therefore, any proposals aimed at achieving a neutral status for Korea, ad 
hoc or permanent, were usually advanced by those adjacent great powers 
that were intent on changing the regional status quo and considered 
neutrality as being one of the first steps that would possibly lead to 
dealignment. Hence, such ideas were viewed with suspicion by those 
adjacent great powers that were already closely aligned with Korea and 
that were eager to maintain the status quo in Northeast Asia. As a rule, at 
the beginning of their expansion, ascending regional great powers 
preferred some sort of neutralization of the Korean peninsula, tantamount 
to its extrication from its existing alliances, to be followed by some form 
of its close alignment, if not outright absorption or protectorate, with an 
expansionist power. In contrast, their descending regional rivals tended to 
defend a regional status quo, i.e. their close alignment with Korea, as long 
as they could; and, if they still failed, only then did they express interest in 
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some sort of neutralization of the Korean peninsula as a way of preventing 
it from falling into the rival’s orbit of influence altogether.108  
To apply Mansourov’s framework to the Korean peninsula dynamics of today, 
China is the “great power” that is already closely aligned with North Korea and views 
suggestions of neutrality by other nations (the United States) as a means to usurp China’s 
dominant position.  From that perspective, it is clear to see that Beijing would not find a 
neutral North Korea in its best interest.   
To summarize, a neutral North Korea would result in Beijing’s possible loss of a 
buffer zone, its definite loss of leverage against the U.S. position on Taiwan, and its 
possible realignment from Beijing to Washington.  Therefore, Beijing does not prefer a 
neutral North Korea.  For the foreseeable future, Beijing will prefer Pyongyang’s gradual 
evolution into a stable and economically prosperous non-nuclear regime, aligned with 
Beijing in the long term. 
D. CONCLUSION 
A continued status quo in the short term, and a gradual evolution into a stable and 
economically prosperous, non-nuclear regime, aligned with Beijing in the long term, best 
suit China’s need for stability.  China’s response to Pyongyang’s provocations, analysis 
of Pyongyang’s significance to China, and an assessment of China’s perception on war 
and collapse on the Korean peninsula all indicate that Beijing is against any policy of 
regime change.  As long as there is no war or collapse, Pyongyang provides Beijing 
strategic advantage in the region as a buffer against U.S. forces and leverage over the 
U.S. position on Taiwan issue. 
While China’s stance on nuclear proliferation has evolved to a point where it 
counters North Korea’s effort to increase its nuclear weapons capabilities, Beijing does 
not view North Korea’s nuclear capabilities as a direct threat to its security.  Beijing 
wishes to dissuade North Korea from pursuing its nuclear ambitions, primarily from fear 
that it might spur a regional nuclear arms race.  North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship has 
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also been increasing tension in the region that Beijing fears may increase the chance of 
war.  Therefore, Beijing has increased efforts to curb Beijing’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons, including supporting UN sanctions against North Korea.  This should not be 
misinterpreted as a sign that Beijing is considering regime change.  Beijing has continued 
economic support for Pyongyang that diminishes the impact of economic sanctions. 
Despite conventional Chinese rhetoric in support of peaceful unification of the 
Koreas in the past, Beijing fears that a unified Korea would have strong ties with the 
United States, eliminating North Korea’s significance as a buffer zone and leverage 
against the United States over Taiwan.  Therefore, instead of a reunified Korea, Beijing 
prefers a continued separate North Korea. 
In discussions of a separate North Korean state, the topic turns to a focus on the 
type of regime Beijing would prefer to see evolve in Pyongyang.  Some speculate that 
Beijing might prefer Pyongyang develop into a socialist regime or become a neutral state.  
Observation of Beijing’s behavior toward the Soviets and Vietnamese in the past 
indicates that common “socialist” ideology is no barrier to conflict.  While Beijing is 
concerned with Pyongyang’s continued alignment with Beijing in security matters, there 
is no evidence to suggest Pyongyang would prefer a socialist government from any other 
form as long as it did not develop closer ties with Washington at the expense of Beijing.  
While neutrality might serve as a means to effect a reunification of the Koreas or offer 
security guarantees for a continued separate North Korean state, it does not suit Beijing’s 
security concerns.  A neutral North Korea would eliminate Pyongyang’s roles as a buffer 
and as leverage against the United States over Taiwan and may even result in an eventual 
shift of alignment from Beijing to Washington.  Therefore, all things considered, in the 
short term, Beijing prefers a continued status quo on the Korean peninsula.  In the long 
term, Beijing desires Pyongyang’s gradual evolution into a stable and economically 
prosperous, non-nuclear regime, aligned with Beijing.   
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V. CHINA AND NORTH KOREA’S PECULIAR 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
A. MISPERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S COERCIVE CAPABILITIES 
Many believe that China has far greater ability to influence North Korea than it 
chooses to exercise.  New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman once indicated that 
China could resolve the North Korean nuclear issue by saying to Pyongyang, “You will 
shut down your nuclear weapons program and put all your reactors under international 
inspection, or we will turn off your lights, cut off your heat and put your whole country 
on a diet. Have we made ourselves clear?”109  Victor Cha, a professor at Georgetown 
University and Asia Director on the National Security Council during the George W. 
Bush administration, is extremely critical of China’s response to the 2009 Cheonan 
incident.  Cha says, “So China needs to make a choice. It needs to support South Korea in 
the U.N. and punish North Korea for its aggression in order to keep deterrence and peace 
in the region.”110  Cha, like Friedman and others, believes that Beijing has strong 
coercive powers over Pyongyang and can effectively “punish” North Korea whenever it 
suits Beijing to do so.   
An increasing number of analysts such as David Kang, director of the Korean 
Studies Institute at the University of Southern California, are starting to believe that 
China’s ability to influence North Korea is far more limited.  In a blog on June 2, 2010, 
Kang wrote, “many analyses of Chinese behavior make an unrealistic assumption: that 
China actually has the ability to force North Korea to do what it wants.”111  Daniel 
Pinkston, a Northeast Asia expert at the International Crisis Group, agrees with Kang, 
stating, “In general, Americans tend to overestimate the influence China has over North 
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Korea.”112    The third hypothesis of this thesis supports Kang’s and Pinkston’s view and 
posits that China’s relationship with North Korea is less coercive in nature than many 
believe and instead is one of peculiar interdependence.   
Despite China’s position as North Korea’s largest trade partner and its greatest 
source of foreign aid, Beijing’s coercive capabilities are limited by two factors that are 
often marginalized.  Beijing is not North Korea’s only source of trade and foreign 
assistance.  Pyongyang has demonstrated a remarkable ability to procure other sources of 
revenue and survive extreme economic hardship.  Secondly, Pyongyang has 
demonstrated that it is keenly aware of its strategic importance to China and has utilized 
that knowledge to counter Beijing’s economic leverage.  This chapter is divided into two 
sections addressing each of these factors.     
B. CHINA AND NORTH KOREA’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP IN 
PERSPECTIVE  
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in a staggering 84 percent 
reduction of trade between North Korea and Russia, from $2.2 billion to less than 
$360 million.113  Over the next decade, that number continually dropped.  Although trade 
began increasing again in the 2000s, reaching over $200 million in 2005, Russian-North 
Korean trade has never returned to Soviet era levels.114  Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, China has regularly (but not always) been North Korea’s largest trade partner and 
greatest single source of external aid, a trend that seems to be increasing in recent years.  
Yet, a comparison of Pyongyang’s trade and foreign assistance with other nations, such 
as South Korea, the United States, and Japan, indicates Pyongyang has the ability to 
procure other sources of revenue.  Over the past two decades, Pyongyang has been able 
to successfully employ nuclear brinkmanship and manipulate international humanitarian 
concerns to secure economic support from the international system, thereby blunting 
Beijing’s economic leverage over Pyongyang.    
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1. Trade and Investment 
Chinese-North Korean trade from 1990 to 1991 increased by 27 percent from 
$483 to $611 million.  Although fluctuating from 1993 to 2001, China has been North 
Korea’s largest trade partner nearly every year since 1990 and by 2005 Chinese-North 
Korean trade reached $1.5 billion.115  Surprisingly, from 1990 to 2001, Japan consistently 
ranked second as North Korea’s largest trade partner and on two occasions, 1995 and 
2001, surpassed even China (see Table 1).  South Korea also surpassed China in trade 
with North Korea in 2001 and has maintained a significant amount of trade with North 
Korea since.  South Korea was second to China in 2005, at just over $1 billion, 
accounting for 26 percent of North Korea’s total trade.116  According to 2009 estimates, 
China remains North Korea’s largest trade partner, accounting for 42 percent of North 
Korea’s exports and 57 percent of North Korea’s imports, but yet again, South Korea 
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Table 1.   North Korean Trade 1990–2005 
China South KoreaUSSR/Russia USA Japan
1990 483 13 2,223 0.03 465
1991 611 111 365 0.2 496
1992 696 173 342 0.1 477
1993 899 186 227 2 465
1994 623 194 140 0.2 485
1995 550 287 84 11.6 588
1996 565 252 65 0.5 514
1997 652 308 84 2.5 466
1998 412 221 65 4.4 394
1999 371 333 50 11.3 349
2000 488 425 46 2.8 464
2001 348 402 69 0.5 475
2002 738 641 81 25.2 369
2003 1,024 697 119 8 264
2004 1,384 724 210 25.3 253




Sources:  1997 Diplomatic White Paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFTA), Republic of 
Korea (ROK), pp. 396, 401; 1998 Diplomatic White Paper, pp. 481 and 486; 2000 Diplomatic White Paper, 
p.497; 2001 Diplomatic White Paper, p.484; 2002 Diplomatic White Paper, p. 497; available at 
www.mofat.go.kr; KOTRA at www.kotra.or.kr; ROK Ministry of Unification; International Monetary 
Fund (1992, pp.247, 304; 1993, pp. 247, 305; 1994, pp. 265, 326; 1995, pp. 269-270; 1996, pp. 275, 342; 
1997, pp. 342, 347; 1998, pp. 280, 289, 349).  
North Korea also diversifies its economic portfolio by pursuing foreign direct 
investment from nations other than China.118  Various Chinese state-owned and private 
enterprises invest massive amounts in North Korea.  Much of this investment targets 
North Korean mining, such as China Tonghua Iron and Steel Group’s $875 million 
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investment in North Korea’s Musan Iron Mine.119 China has also assisted North Korea in 
forming special economic zones (SEZ) such as the Raijin-Sonbong region on the border 
between China and North Korea, modeled after successful SEZs in China.  In 2008, 
Chinese investment in North Korea accounted for $41.2 million.  But China may not be 
largest source of FDI in North Korea.  South Korea may have surpassed China as the 
largest investor in North Korea, after it established the massive Kaesong Industrial 
Complex (KIC) with North Korea in 2002.   
The absence of standardized reporting on South Korea’s yearly investment in 
North Korea makes a direct comparison between Beijing and Seoul’s FDI in North Korea 
problematic.  Seoul considers economic transactions with Pyongyang as intra-country 
and, therefore, does not report its investments in North Korea to sources of comparative 
economic data, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).  According to available data from other sources, however, Seoul may have 
invested over $220 million in the KIC from 2002-2007.120  At an average of 45 million a 
year, South Korean investment in the KIC alone would have surpassed total Chinese FDI 
during this period.  Apart from the KIC, Seoul also invests significant amounts into other 
ventures such as the Mount Kumgang tourist resort.  Between 1999 and 2002, the 
Hyundai Group invested over $400 million in the resort.121  Based on these numbers, 
South Korea may have easily been Pyongyang’s largest single source of FDI in the 
2000s.122 
In December 2010, China announced its intent to invest $2 billion in a new 
venture in the Rajin-Sonbong SEZ.123  If fulfilled, China will surpass South Korea as the 
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largest source of FDI in North Korea.  The implications, however, are clear.  China is not 
Pyongyang’s only source of trade or investment.  While South Korea has been the largest 
alternative source of revenue, Japan and Russia have also invested significant amounts 
into North Korea since the 1990s and European nations have contributed massive sums in 
official development assistance (ODA).  In 2004 alone, North Korea received over $1.4 
billion in ODA funds (excluding China, South Korea, Japan, the United States and 
Russia).124  While Beijing may be Pyongyang’s preferred choice for economic 
cooperation, it is not Pyongyang’s only option.   
Also of significance, when North Korea has lost massive amounts of revenue in 
the past, it has managed to survive.  When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, North 
Korea lost over $1.7 billion in trade but persevered while it developed greater economic 
trade with China and other nations.  From 1997 to 1998, China reduced its trade with 
North Korea by nearly half during the worst years of North Korea’s great famine (see 
Table 1).  While millions starved, the Kim regime stayed in power.  
2.  Foreign Assistance 
The end of Soviet assistance to Pyongyang the 1990s also had a devastating 
impact on a struggling North Korean economy without the capital to purchase sufficient 
food or fuel on the international market.  China again stepped in and eventually became 
North Korea’s largest source of foreign aid, providing up to 90 percent of North Korea’s 
external fuel and providing up to one-third of North Koreas external food supply by the 
mid-2000s.125  But again, as with trade, Pyongyang has often found other sources of 
assistance other than Beijing (see Figure 1 below). 
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Figure 1.   Major Food Donors to North Korea, 1995–2008 (From Interfais, 2009) 
In 1994 and 1995, possibly as a result of Pyongyang’s refusal to cooperate with 
Chinese suggested economic reforms, Beijing significantly reduced the level of its 
foreign aid to Pyongyang.   According to Marcus Noland, “If there were a single 
proximate trigger for the North Korean famine, this reduction was it.  The floods of 1995 
and 1996, through a contributory factor, were not a primary cause of the famine.”126  
During this period of reduced Chinese aid, Pyongyang employed nuclear brinkmanship to 
secure massive amounts of U.S., South Korean, and Japanese foreign aid through the 
stipulations of the 1994 Agreed Framework.  While the promised two light-water reactors 
were never completed and the United States failed to deliver all of the promised fuel, 
North Korea, nevertheless became the largest Asian recipient of U.S. aid between 1995-
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2002—receiving more than $1 billion in food and energy.127  U.S. food assistance 
increased from 1994–2002, peaking at $177 million in 2001.128   
In 2002, Washington ended heavy fuel shipment to North Korea promised under 
the Agreed Framework, in protest against the discovery of North Korea’s HEU program.  
U.S. food aid decreased dramatically from $171 million in 2002 to only $27 million in 
2003 and by 2006 the United States had completely halted any food aid to North 
Korea.129  Following North Korea’s nuclear detonation in 2006, the United States again 
resumed food aid for North Korea in 2007 and by 2008 had reached $106 million.130  
Similarly, under the 2007 six-party talks, the United States agreed to resumption of fuel 
oil to North Korea and by March of 2008 USAID had delivered 100,000 metric tons of 
fuel oil.131 
South Korea has also contributed massive amounts of aid to North Korea under 
the Agreed Framework, six-party talks, or through separate bilateral agreements.  Under 
Seoul’s Sunshine policy, South Korea delivered 500,000 metric tons of aid to North 
Korea annually, primarily in food and fertilizers.132  Through the six-party talks, South 
Korea delivered 145 metric tons of fuel oil to North Korea.133  While, the United States 
and South Korea are the two largest contributors of foreign aid outside of China, North 
Korea has other potential sources of aid. 
Japan is also a potential source of massive economic aid for North Korea.  As part 
of a reconciliation package Tokyo was negotiating with Pyongyang in the late 1990s, 
Japan offered Pyongyang as much as $10 billion (nearly half of North Korea’s total 
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$20 billion GDP).134  The package did not materialize for two reasons.  The Japanese 
public responded with outrage in 2002, when Kim Jong-Il admitted to Japanese Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi that North Korea had kidnapped Japanese citizens in the 
1970s and 1980s as part of a program to spy on the Japanese.135  That years was also 
when the United States reported North Korea’s HEU program.  Although Japan cut off all 
aid as a result, Japan has indicated during six-party talks that it is willing to resume aid if 
an agreement can be reached on Pyongyang’s nuclear program. 
Russia and North Korea have also been improving economic relations lately and 
Russia has demonstrated interests in building a trans-Korean railway.  As part of the six-
party talks, Russia promised 200,000 metric tons of fuel to North Korea in 2006 (as yet 
undelivered).136  In 2006, Russia reportedly forgave Pyongyang over $6 billion of debt in 
order to pave the way forward for future economic cooperation between the two 
nations.137   
Beyond conventional trade and foreign assistance, Pyongyang also pulls in 
significant revenue from “unconventional sources.”  According to Marcus Noland, from 
early to mid-2000s, “North Korea has derived roughly one-third of its revenues from aid, 
roughly one-third from conventional exports, and roughly one-third from unconventional 
sources (in estimated order of significance, missile sales, drug trafficking, remittances, 
counterfeiting, and smuggling).  Remittances come mostly from a community of pro-
Pyongyang and ethnic Koreans in Japan, contract laborers in Russia, Eastern Europe, and 
elsewhere; and increasingly from highly vulnerable refugees in China who number 
possibly 100,000.”138       
In summary, China is North Korea’s single largest source of revenue, but it is not 
Pyongyang’s only option.  Should China cut off all assistance to North Korea, the impact 
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would be significant.  Yet North Korea survived the loss of Soviet aid and massive 
reductions in trade with China during its famine years.  And there is no way to know just 
how much fuel oil North Korea has in reserves to continue its support to vital government 
and military functions while it searches for options to replace a hypothetical loss of 
Chinese assistance.  Should China join the United States, Japan, and South Korea in a 
concerted hard-line approach against Pyongyang, those options would be severely limited 
but not entirely nonexistent.   
Though dubious, Russia might be willing to increase aid for North Korea.  There 
is also the possibility that if North Korea holds out long enough, European nations such 
as France or the Netherlands might intervene and send North Korea humanitarian 
assistance, to include fuel oil.  France donated over $1 billion in ODA to North Korea 
and in 2007, the Netherlands was the single largest contributor of ODA to the DPRK, 
contributing $107 million.139  Venezuela and Iran might also cooperate to provide North 
Korea the necessary fuel oil to limp on indefinitely if only to retain a political ally against 
the United States.  While these are admittedly only speculations, Beijing must consider 
all such possibilities before gambling on its ability to coerce Pyongyang.   
Should China ignore the possible consequences of war and collapse and sever all 
economic interaction with North Korea, Pyongyang could possibly survive.  Eventually 
Pyongyang may succeed in procuring other sources of revenue or China would finally 
buckle under the pressure of mass migration, an increasing threat of war, and 
international humanitarian pressure to assist millions of starving North Koreans.  In this 
case, China would not only have lost face but it would also resume a relationship with 
Pyongyang with even less leverage than it has over Pyongyang now. 
On the other hand, should Beijing’s gambit be successful and Pyongyang is 
forced back to six-party talks with a more compliant attitude toward de-nuclearization, 
Beijing still risks losing its strategic role as North Korea’s primary benefactor.  
Pyongyang may negotiate in a manner to acquire massive assistance from the United 
States, Japan, and South Korea that would eclipse China’s influence over Pyongyang.  
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The Kim regime has shown itself quite willing to starve its population to limit the 
influence of unwanted external agencies.  In 2006, Pyongyang refused WFP requirements 
for transparency and control over disbursement of food donations tied into an agreement 
that would have provided Pyongyang enough aid to feed 6.4 million people.140  Instead, 
Beijing opted for an agreement that would feed only 1.9 million but allowed Pyongyang 
to maintain its control over disbursement.  Beijing currently enjoys the most unfettered 
access to North Korea of any external nation.  Should Beijing attempt to coerce North 
Korea by shutting off economic aid, it is quite likely that Pyongyang will attempt to limit 
its future dependence on Beijing.   
Should Beijing be successful in forcing Pyongyang into an agreement, there is no 
way to know whether or not Pyongyang will honor its agreements.  In this case, China 
may well have forfeited its strategic influence over Pyongyang for nothing.  And should 
North Korea actually honor an agreement to denuclearize, Beijing will have succeeded in 
effecting a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula but sacrificed North Korea’s 
strategic value to Beijing as a buffer zone and leverage against the United States over its 
position on Taiwan.  In forcing Pyongyang back to negotiations in the manner suggested 
by Victor Cha and others, Beijing runs the risk of a realignment of Pyongyang’s security 
interests from Beijing to Washington. 
C. NORTH KOREA’S DEFIANCE OF CHINA 
China’s primary strategic priorities are stability and economic development.  
China believes it must maintain the Kim regime in order to prevent collapse or war and 
also values North Korea as a buffer against U.S. forces and as leverage against the United 
States’ position on Taiwan.  Pyongyang is keenly aware of its significance in China’s 
broader and regional strategic objectives and has utilized that awareness as counter 
leverage against Beijing’s economic influence. 
The following sections explore how Pyongyang has utilized that awareness in 
direct and indirect defiance of Beijing’s wishes.  It begins by defining the abstract nature 
of knowledge as the basis of North Korea’s leverage over Beijing.  Next it illustrates how 
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Pyongyang employs a clear understanding of its own political capabilities and the 
limitations of Beijing’s political options, to indirectly challenge China by manipulating 
its fears of collapse.  The last section explores specific examples of when Pyongyang has 
directly applied counter leverage against Beijing, by playing the “Taiwan card.” 
1. You Only Have Leverage, If You Know You Have Leverage 
Leverage is a tricky thing to define.  Similar to multiple explanations for the 
concept of “power,” the context often defines the concept.  For instance, by its most base 
definition, “leverage” describes the mechanical advantage of a lever.  In a financial 
context, leverage describes any technique to multiply gains or losses.  Within a political 
framework, leverage is best defined as the ability to influence a decision or an act.  
Therefore “economic leverage” is the ability to influence a decision or an act based on 
the ability to provide or deny economic compensation.  However, when discussing North 
Korea’s leverage over Pyongyang, the concept of “leverage” is a bit more complicated.    
Pyongyang’s leverage over Beijing is not based on quantifiable metrics like 
economic or military power.  Instead, Pyongyang’s leverage over Beijing is abstract, 
based on Pyongyang’s awareness of Beijing’s desires and fears.  Leverage in this case 
exists only if China has those desires or fears and only if Pyongyang is aware of them.  
Fortunately for Pyongyang, Beijing makes clear in its official policy and actions that 
stability and economic development are its main strategic priorities and that reunification 
with Taiwan follows closely in rankings of national objectives.  And Beijing freely 
admits its fear of war and collapse on the Korean peninsula.  Therefore, as parents might 
scare a child with tales of the boogey-man to control the child’s behavior, Pyongyang 
scares Beijing by escalating regional tensions that increase the chance of war and 
collapse and by directly threatening to develop closer relations with Taiwan.  The 
question is why is Pyongyang not afraid of war or collapse?      
The counterintuitive factor in Beijing’s ability to leverage China’s fears of 
collapse and war is that either scenario would have far greater consequences for the Kim 
regime, than for China.  If China was dragged into another Korean war, it could face 
major losses in lives and finances.  Similarly, a collapse scenario would hold significant 
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humanitarian and economic consequences for Beijing.  Either scenario would cause 
massive regional instability and financial consequences that could pose a major challenge 
for a CCP already facing substantial internal pressures.  But, while a collapse or war 
scenario in North Korea could cause a potential leadership crisis in China, it would mean 
almost certain death for the Kim regime.  How then is Pyongyang able to threaten China 
with its own demise?  The answer is in differing domestic political thresholds for war and 
instability. 
The CCP, despite its authoritarian nature is heavily constrained by domestic 
insecurity, which is why stability and economic prosperity have become crucial for the 
CCP to maintain its position of leadership.  In contrast to the more totalitarian and 
isolated existence during the Korean War era, Chinese today are far better informed and 
enjoy many more freedoms than their predecessors.  The rise of nationalism and 
increasing social unrest ushered in by liberalization of the market place increasingly 
challenges the CCP’s ability to control the masses.  A North Korean collapse or war 
would be extremely destabilizing and could possibly lead to a leadership crisis for the 
CCP.  Therefore, similar to elected officials in the United States, leaders in China are 
constrained by a low public threshold for instability or war.  Pyongyang, however, is not 
politically constrained by any such political thresholds. 
Unlike democratic elected leaders in the West or even the authoritarian leadership 
of the CCP, Kim Jong-Il and his elite followers exercise near complete control over the 
North Korean population.  Over six decades, the Kim regime has instituted a range of 
authoritarian tools that have completely subdued the North Korean population’s ability to 
resist or even form institutions that would allow political opposition to take root.  These 
tools include:  “restrictive social policies; manipulation of ideas and information; use of 
force; co-optation; manipulation of foreign governments; and institutional coup-
proofing.”141  As a result, the Kim regime makes all political, judicial, legislative, and 
economic decisions with little regard for the opinions or desires of the North Korean 
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masses.142  This allows the Kim regime to freely engage in seemingly irrational 
provocations against far superior forces, without the political constraint of public opinion. 
Contrary to what some may believe, Kim Jong-Il is not an irrational madman.  
After a trip to North Korea in 2001, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
described Kim Jong-Il as, “someone who is practical, decisive, and seemingly non-
ideological.”143  Former South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung has also described Kim 
Jong-Il as, “rational and informed.”144  Kim Jong-Il’s strategies of collapse and nuclear 
brinkmanship are founded on a rational assessment of his opponent’s will to fight.  Kim 
Jong-Il correctly believes that his opponents are far less willing (or politically capable) of 
going to war or accepting a collapse of the North Korean state.  It is not that the Kim 
regime has less to lose than its adversaries; it is that the Kim regime is more capable of 
risking it all than its adversaries (or ally in the case of China).  Pyongyang demonstrates a 
clear understanding of this fundamental dynamic and employs that knowledge in nuclear 
brinkmanship against its adversaries and in collapse brinkmanship against China.        
2. The Collapse Card 
Since China does not perceive Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities as a direct threat, 
and since China is one of North Korea’s few remaining allies, Beijing is not a target of 
Pyongyang’s nuclear brinkmanship.  Instead, Pyongyang indirectly threatens China with 
collapse to extract economic support from Beijing even when Pyongyang defies China’s 
wishes.  Although Beijing desires to maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula, it 
does not want a nuclear North Korea.  Beijing has made its stance on the matter clear by 
supporting UN sanctions against North Korea following Pyongyang’s detonation of 
nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009.  Yet Beijing has continued to provide economic 
support for Pyongyang that diminishes the effect of those sanctions.   
Beijing is constrained to keep supporting North Korea for fear that North Korea 
will collapse due to economic pressures, or pursue riskier brinkmanship tactics to extract 
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greater assistance from the West, increasing the threat of war.  As neither of these 
scenarios is acceptable to Beijing, it is forced to continue its economic support for 
Pyongyang.  Some critics of China’s behavior, who feel China is not so constrained, 
entertain other explanations. 
The most suspicious believe that Beijing actually supports North Korea’s nuclear 
aspirations in order to thwart the United States.  This viewpoint would explain China’s 
continued support for the Kim regime and historic tolerance for North Korea’s 
provocations.  Some advocates of this viewpoint go so far as to suggest that Beijing and 
Pyongyang are working together in orchestrating North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship.145 
John Tkacik believes that, “…China’s main, if not sole, interest is to prolong the six-
party talks process indefinitely so that the world eventually will come to accept a nuclear 
North Korea in the same way it has accepted a nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan. China 
most likely calculates that North Korea, as a nuclear power, can complicate U.S. strategic 
planning and use its increased leverage to extort international food and energy aid with 
which to prop up Pyongyang’s tyrannical regime.”146 
While China may in fact wish to thwart the United States it is unlikely that 
Beijing’s goals are to support Pyongyang’s nuclear program.  There are two primary 
flaws in the viewpoint of Tkacik and others that share his views.  China has legitimate 
reasons for not wanting a nuclear North Korea, foremost because international acceptance 
of a nuclear North Korea might prompt Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan to pursue 
the same goal.  Also, though North Korea and China may be allies today, that may not 
always be the case in the future.  Very few nations want a nuclear-armed neighbor.  
Secondly, critics of China’s erratic behavior toward North Korea fail to recognize similar 
inconsistencies in U.S. behavior toward North Korea.  For instance, in 2002, the Bush 
administration declared North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil” and cut off all financial 
aid to Pyongyang by 2006.  Then, in 2008 the Bush administration removed North Korea 
from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and resumed food and fuel aid.   
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It is hard to imagine anyone suspecting the Bush regime of secretly wanting North 
Korea to achieve nuclear weapons state status.  Yet despite Pyongyang’s constant 
infractions on agreements made in the NPT, the Agreed Framework, and most recently, 
the six-party talks, the United States has repeatedly returned to a strategy of providing 
North Korea assistance.  The primary reason the Bush administration and previous 
administration has demonstrated inconsistencies in its engagement style with North 
Korea is because of Pyongyang’s nuclear brinkmanship.  North Korea perceives a low 
U.S. political threshold for the loss of lives and financial consequences associated with 
war with North Korea.   Understanding the limitations this places on Washington’s policy 
options, North Korea has constantly pushed the envelope with nuclear and conventional 
provocations.  Since war is not an option and economic sanctions have not prevented 
North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons, Washington is constantly maneuvered into 
taking a carrot approach toward Pyongyang.   
In a similar fashion, Pyongyang manipulates Beijing’s fear of collapse to leverage 
continued economic cooperation and assistance.  While Pyongyang’s pursuit of the 
nuclear weapons is the most obvious example, there are other examples of how 
Pyongyang defies China.  Since the early 1990s Pyongyang has consistently rebuked 
Beijing’s efforts to influence economic reforms in North Korea.  Kim Jong-Il had little 
desire to replicate the Chinese model of reform into a market system.  Liberalization of 
the market place would eliminate one of Pyongyang’s most potent methods of population 
control, regulation over the nature and quantity of products each North Korean received.  
As a compromise Pyongyang established isolated SEZs to replicate Chinese success with 
such ventures in the 1980s.147  
In 1991, the Chinese assisted North Korea in developing the Rajin-Sonbong SEZ, 
but the venture failed to draw in foreign investors for several reasons.  Pyongyang 
resisted China’s intent for North Korea to establish a legitimate business environment and 
instead focused on transforming the region into a gambling center and area where North 
Korea could conduct illicit trade and questionable financial transactions, similar to 
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Pyongyang’s activities in Macau.  Despite Beijing’s efforts, Pyongyang refused to 
develop the technological infrastructure, appropriately skilled workforce, and reliable and 
credible financial institutions to attract or maintain any substantial foreign investors.148   
Despite the failure of Raijin-Sonbong, Pyongyang attempted a similar venture, in 
establishing the Sinuiju SEZ in 2002, this time without China’s initial support.  Beijing, 
already miffed by Pyongyang’s snub was even more frustrated by Pyongyang’s plans to 
hire Yang Bin, a well-known corrupt Chinese business man, to transform the region into 
a “Macao of the North.”149  This time, however, Beijing drew the line and arrested Yang 
Bin.   
In each of these cases, despite the risk of losing Chinese economic support, 
Pyongyang has persisted in its defiance of China and refused to adopt Chinese economic 
reforms.  Pyongyang believes that Beijing has no true option but to continue providing 
economic support to Pyongyang or risk a North Korean collapse.  China’s recent 
announcement in December 2010 that it will invest $2 billion more in the Rajin-Songbon 
SEZ certainly supports Pyongyang’s perceptions.   
Despite the massive amounts of revenue China pours into North Korea, 
Pyongyang has often shown itself impervious to Beijing’s influence.  China’s attempts to 
reform North Korea’s economy only serve to confirm Pyongyang’s perspective that 
China will not allow it to collapse.  Ironically, the more revenue Beijing pours into 
Pyongyang, the more it may be increasing Pyongyang’s leverage over China.  There is 
some conjecture that, “the greater North Korea’s dependency, the more fearful Chinese 
leaders may be that a sharp withdrawal of PRC economic support could destabilize North 
Korea.”150  Based on this view Pyongyang is able to play the “collapse card” and 
continually defy China not so much despite Beijing’s economic support for Pyongyang, 
but because of it.      
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3. The Taiwan Card 
In contrast to the indirect nature of “collapse brinkmanship,” Pyongyang has 
directly countered Pyongyang’s economic leverage by playing the “Taiwan card.”  
Although stability and economic development are Beijing’s top strategic priorities, 
reunification of Taiwan is also a core strategic concern.  Pyongyang recognizes China’s 
strategic interest in reunification of Taiwan and realizes that Beijing does not desire 
North Korean to develop stronger ties with Taiwan.  China’s primary demand of nations 
that wish economic commerce with China is that they recognize a one-China policy.  
Should North Korea ever recognize Taiwan as a separate nation, it would be a serious 
loss of face for Beijing.  Therefore, just as with collapses brinkmanship, North Korea 
utilizes its awareness of Beijing’s desires and fears as counter leverage against Beijing’s 
economic influence.  The following are examples of when Pyongyang has directly 
responded to Chinese economic leverage by playing the “Taiwan card.”  
When Chinese economic aid waned during the mid-1990s, Pyongyang reportedly 
approached Taiwan, amongst others for aid.151  In one particular instance, Pyongyang 
refused to cooperate with a Chinese-led UN development team in 1997 that called for 
liberal economic reforms if Pyongyang wished to continue receiving aid.  Pyongyang not 
only refused the recommendations, but also insulted the team, calling Deng Xiaoping “a 
traitor to socialism.”152  When Beijing responded with threats to cut off aid, Pyongyang 
escalated tensions by threatening “to play the Taiwan card.”  In this case “the Taiwan 
card,” was Pyongyang’s plans to increase dialogue and interaction with Taiwan by 
establishing direct commercial flights between Pyongyang and Taipei.153  The 
implications were clear, Beijing, faced with the possibility that its closest “ally” might 
recognize Taiwan, backed off and resumed aid to North Korea. 
Pyongyang acted similarly when President Bill Clinton visited China in 1998.  
Pyongyang viewed the visit as possibly a precursor to a cooperative strategy against 
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North Korea.  Separate reports indicate that North Korea again pursued closer ties with 
Taiwan, ranging from:  an offer to dispose of Taiwan’s nuclear wastes; allowing Taiwan 
to conduct intelligence operation against China from North Korea; and again, resuming 
negotiations to establish direct commercial flights between Pyongyang and Taipei.154  
Even more recently during the Chinese-North Korea spat over Sinuiju SEZ in 
2002, Beijing again approached Taiwan.  The focus this time was centered on discussions 
of opening reciprocal economic liaison offices.  A Taiwanese company, Formosa Plastics 
Group, was heavily interested in investing in North Korea’s steel industry and was also 
considering petrochemicals and shipbuilding ventures with North Korea.155 
D. CONCLUSION 
The hypothesis that this chapter supports is that China’s relationship with North 
Korea is less coercive in nature than many believe and instead is one of peculiar 
interdependence.  This hypothesis suggests that Beijing does not have considerable 
influence over Pyongyang, nor is it as asymmetrical as many seem to believe.  Despite 
China’s role as Pyongyang’s largest trade partner and greatest source of economic 
assistance, it is not Pyongyang’s only source of revenue.  Over the past 20 years, 
Pyongyang has shown itself capable of procuring revenue from a wide range of 
conventional and unconventional sources.  While some assume that if China cuts off its 
support to Pyongyang, especially in a concerted effort with the United States and South 
Korea, Pyongyang will have no choice but to capitulate.  History has proven, however, 
that North Korea is capable of enduring through times of extreme economic hardships 
and that Pyongyang is more than willing to let its population suffer and die in the millions  
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before compromising its stance on sovereignty.  This greatly limits the effectiveness of 
any attempt to economically strangle the Kim regime.  China, more than any other nation, 
seems clearly aware of that factor. 
Of even greater concern to Beijing is the possibility that North Korea might 
escalate tensions to the point of war in an effort to force its adversaries to abandon efforts 
to isolate and starve Pyongyang into submission.  In either scenario, China stands to 
lose—not only in the short term, but in the long term as well.  In the short term, regional 
instability caused by a North Korean collapse or war will have dire financial and 
humanitarian consequences for an embattled CCP.  In the long term, China will have lost 
an ally that provided it with a buffer against U.S. forces and the political and military 
leverage North Korea provided China in its dispute with the United States over Taiwan. 
Pyongyang seems all too aware of China’s limited options and manipulates 
Beijing’s fears to counter China’s economic leverage.  Pyongyang defies China’s 
attempts to influence its behavior by indirectly playing the “collapse card” or by directly 
threatening Beijing by courting relations with Taiwan.  It is true that in order for 
Pyongyang to survive, it needs Beijing’s support.  But it is equally true that Beijing 
cannot achieve its goals of regional stability or maintain North Korea as a buffer and 
leverage against the U.S. position on Taiwan if it allows Pyongyang to collapse.  Despite 
some views that China has an asymmetrical ability to influence North Korea, each nation 
requires the other to achieve its respective political objectives and, therefore, a peculiar 




A. SUMMARY FINDINGS 
The close relationship China and North Korea once shared has greatly 
deteriorated because of the divergent political and economic choices of Kim Il-Sung and 
Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.  While China today is the world’s second largest economy 
and increasingly globally integrated, North Korea is one of the world’s poorest nations 
and possibly the most isolated.  While Chinese and North Koreans retain some cultural 
bonds, the big brother -little brother relationship has long faded.  The two most important 
remaining cultural perceptions shared by Chinese and North Koreans are anti-U.S. and 
anti-Japanese sentiment.  Externally, both China and North Korea perceive the United 
States as the primary means and obstacle to achieving their respective political 
objectives.  In China’s case, this objective is a peaceful rise into international prominence 
and reunification of Taiwan.  In North Korea’s case, it is achieving nuclear weapons state 
status to ensure its survival.   
North Korean provocations and nuclear brinkmanship are increasingly threatening 
regional stability.  Beijing fears any war or collapse scenario on the Korean peninsula and 
believing the Kim regime too entrenched to remove by any other options, prefers to 
support the status quo in the short term.  Beijing also benefits from North Korea’s role as 
a buffer and as leverage against the U.S. position on Taiwan.   
In the long term, Beijing is against reunification for fear that a reunified Korea 
would maintain close alignment with the United States.  While neutrality appears to be a 
better option, Beijing would still lose North Korea as political and military leverage 
against the U.S. position on Taiwan.  Beijing would prefer that North Korea give up its 
nuclear weapons, primarily for fear that Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan might also 
pursue nuclear weapons.  As China itself is not directly threatened by Pyongyang’s 
nuclear capabilities, however, Beijing is not as concerned with North Korea’s nuclear 
status except when tensions escalate to a level that threatens war and instability.  Beijing 
is less concerned with whether a future North Korean regime remains socialist or not than 
 84
it is that the future regime remains aligned with Beijing’s security concerns in the region.  
Therefore, in the long term, North Korea prefers the gradual evolution of the Kim regime 
into a stable, prosperous, and non-nuclear regime that remains aligned with Beijing. 
Despite Beijing position as North Korea’s largest trade partner and its greatest 
source of foreign aid, Beijing’s coercive capabilities are limited by two factors that are 
often marginalized.  Beijing is not North Korea’s only source of trade and foreign 
assistance.  Pyongyang has demonstrated a remarkable ability to procure other sources of 
revenue and survive extreme economic hardship in the meanwhile.  Secondly, Pyongyang 
has demonstrated that it is keenly aware of its strategic importance to China and has 
utilized that knowledge to counter Beijing’s economic leverage indirectly through 
collapse brinkmanship and directly by playing the “Taiwan card.”  Therefore China’s 
relationship with North Korea is less coercive in nature than many believe, and instead is 
one of peculiar interdependence, based on each country’s reliance on the other to achieve 
its respective strategic goals. 
B. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
This thesis has defined Beijing’s short-term and long-term preferences for the 
Korean peninsula and shed light on the peculiar interdependent nature of China and 
North Korea’s relationship.  To do so, it has focused primarily on the key players in 
Korean peninsula dynamics and has marginalized the impact of broader international 
dynamics that also have significant impact on the future of the Korean peninsula.  The 
rise of India and a resurgent Russia will undoubtedly affect the nature of Sino-U.S. 
relations, as will the stance of all Asian and Southeast Asian nations either in support or 
against the rise of China.  The growing role of regional and international institutions such 
as ASEAN and the newly formed G-20 will likely influence the dynamics on the Korean 
peninsula as well but are beyond the purview of this thesis.  In short, there are further 
factors that should be considered to form a truly comprehensive view of the Korean 
peninsula dilemma. 
From a theoretical angle, this thesis adopts a realist viewpoint, focuses on security 
concerns of state actors, and does not take into account the value of alternative theoretical 
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viewpoints.  A liberal view of Korean peninsula dynamics would have focused far more 
on the roles of institutions which are largely ignored in this thesis.  While not completely 
ignored, constructivism has been given a short shrift within this thesis as well, since its 
explanatory value seems relatively weak in this case.  The only area where a 
constructivist emphasis on the impact of elite preferences was given any consideration 
was in regards to a few key leaders such as Kim Sung-Il, Kim Jong-Il, Mao Zedong, 
Deng Xiaoping and George W. Bush.  This thesis did consider the constructivist concern 
over the impact of ideological and cultural bonds between China and North Korea on 
Peninsula dynamics.  Considering the erratic behavior of U.S. support for the Agreed 
Framework caused by disagreement between the executive and legislative branches, 
competing perspectives among elites in China might offer a much more complex view of 
Chinese perceptions of Korean peninsula affairs.  In short, while the argument of this 
thesis is that China’s and North Korea’s relationship is best explained from a realist 
perspective, other theoretical viewpoints could add certain dynamics in some areas. 
Lastly, the hypotheses in this thesis have been proven credible based on China’s 
and North Korea’s current domestic and international dynamics.  Those dynamics are not 
static but in constant fluctuation.  As Samuel Kim says about China’s stance on 
reunification, “It is important to recognize that China’s thinking on Korean unification, 
far from being cast in stone, changes as the domestic, Northeast Asian regional, and 
global situations—including perhaps the most importantly the state of Sino-American 
relations and the emerging role of the United States in Northeast Asian and Korean 
peninsular affairs—evolve.”156  While unable to address every factor or theoretical 
viewpoint to define peninsula dynamics, this study has arguably addressed the most 
relevant factors which support or oppose the hypotheses of this study.  While keeping the 
limitations of this thesis in mind, its hypotheses may offer some value to policy makers in 
developing strategies for dealing with China on Korean peninsula matters.         
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C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Beijing does not share the same priorities as Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo when 
dealing with North Korea.  Since the conservative South Korean President Lee Myung-
Bak and President Obama have taken office there appears to be a remarkable growth of 
consensus between Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington on how to deal with North Korea.  All 
three prefer a hard-line stance against Pyongyang, and endorse economic strangulation as 
a tactic to effect a regime change or at least modify the current regime’s behavior.  While 
this consensus may only be temporary, while it lasts, China’s stance on Pyongyang has 
become all the more imperative in the eyes of those who wish to force North Korea to 
capitulate to the demands of the United States and its allies.  Should the hypotheses 
posited in this thesis prove true, China will not change its preferences for dealing with 
North Korea and will continue to support the Kim regime indefinitely.  This implies two 
possible options for Washington. 
Considering the primacy of Taiwanese reunification in Beijing’s strategic 
concerns and North Korea’s manipulation of that factor, U.S. policy makers might want 
to consider a comprehensive approach to resolving the North Korean and Taiwan 
dilemmas.  While it is unlikely that Beijing will ever pursue regime change in 
Pyongyang, Washington may be able to persuade Beijing to take a harder stance by 
negotiating an agreement to reduce or halt U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  On a broader level, 
if Washington can ameliorate some of China’s fears that the United States is seeking to 
contain China’s rise, Beijing may see less advantage in North Korea as a buffer zone. 
A far riskier but possibly effective tactic would be for Washington to purposely 
heighten tensions on the Korean peninsula by increasing U.S. military presence in the 
region and conducting more combined military exercises with South Korea and if 
possible Japan.  This tactic will almost surely be condemned by Beijing and Seoul, and 
may prompt North Korean military attacks against ROK or U.S. forces.  As tensions 
escalate increasing the likelihood of war and collapse, China may be forced to take 
tougher measures to restrain Pyongyang.  Based on the last hypothesis of this thesis, 
North Korea will risk war rather than capitulate to China’s attempts to control its 
behavior.  Faced with a possibility that war is inevitable in any case, however, Beijing 
 87
may choose to support the United States and its allies in the hopes that Pyongyang will 
back down.  This course of action is less a recommendation than it is recognition of an 
extreme option. 
If Washington is not willing to risk war against North Korea or make concessions 
on its stance on Taiwan, policy makers may want to come to grips with the fact that 
China is not likely to change its preferences toward the Korean peninsula.  The United 
States can either continue to attempt to pressure Pyongyang without the support of China, 
which will likely prove pointless, or resume bilateral engagement with Pyongyang.  
Although Pyongyang has repeatedly failed to honor its agreements in the past, 
Washington also has never completely honored its side of past agreements because of 
periodic DPRK provocations, neither has the United States ever given Pyongyang the 
comprehensive security guarantees it demands before giving up its pursuit of nuclear 
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